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We  examine  the  firm-  and  country-level  determinants  of  the  currency  denomination  of 
small business loans. We first model the choice of loan currency in a framework which 
features a trade-off between lower cost of debt and the risk of firm-level distress costs, and 
also  examines  the  impact  of  information  asymmetry  between  banks  and  firms.  When 
foreign currency funds come at a lower interest rate, all foreign currency earners as well as 
those  local  currency  earners  with  high  revenues  and  low  distress  costs  choose  foreign 
currency loans. When the banks have imperfect information on the currency and level of 
firms revenues, even more local earners switch to foreign currency loans, as they do not 
bear the full cost of the corresponding credit risk. 
We then test the implications of our model by using a 2005 survey with responses from 
9,655 firms in 26 transition countries. The survey contains details on 3,105 recent bank 
loans. At the firm level, our findings suggest that firms with foreign currency income and 
assets are more likely to borrow in a foreign currency. In contrast, firm-level distress costs 
and financial transparency affect the currency denomination only weakly. At the country 
level, the interest rate advantages of foreign currency funds and the exchange rate volatility 
do  not  explain  the  foreign  currency  borrowing  in  our  sample.  However,  foreign  bank 
presence, weak corporate governance and the absence of capital controls encourage foreign 
currency borrowing. All in all, we cannot confirm that “carry-trade behavior” is the key 
driver of foreign currency borrowing by small firms in transition economies. Our results do, 
however,  support  the  conjecture  that  banking-sector  structures  and  institutions  that 
aggravate information asymmetries may facilitate foreign currency borrowing. 
Keywords: foreign currency borrowing, competition, banking sector, market structure. 
JEL: G21, G30, F34, F37. I.  Introduction 
A large proportion of firms and households in many countries borrow in foreign 
currency. In East Asia, corporate debt is split about equally between foreign and domestic 
currencies (Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003)), while in several Latin American 
countries the share of foreign currency debt exceeds 20 percent (Galindo, Panizza and 
Schiantarelli (2003)). Recently, foreign currency borrowing has also expanded rapidly in 
many Eastern European transition countries. Between 20 and 75 percent of all corporate 
loans in Eastern European countries are now denominated in a foreign currency (European 
Central Bank (2006), p. 39). 
Foreign currency borrowing is widely alleged to be one of the major causes of the 
severe financial crisis that hit many Asian countries in the 1990’s. Foreign currency 
borrowing in Eastern Europe could similarly lead to widespread credit default and the 
destabilization of the entire banking sector there if the current global financial crisis 
involves further sharp depreciations of local currencies (as was the case, for example, with 
the Hungarian forint and Polish zloty in the fall of 2008). 
Indeed, there are fears that many small non-exporting firms and households in Eastern 
Europe may have taken out commercial loans and mortgages in euros − or even in Swiss 
francs and Japanese yen − in order to benefit from the substantially lower interest rate on 
the foreign currency (clearly the expected introduction of the euro and increasing trade 
flows also explain some of the loan currency choices).
 1 These "small men’s carry trades" 
                                                 
1 Wall Street Journal, May 29
th, 2007. Carry trades, in which investors borrow in a low-yielding currency and 
invest in a high-yielding one, are a widespread phenomenon. At the beginning of 2007 it was estimated that 
that as much as US$1 trillion was involved in the yen carry trade for example (The Economist, February 1
st, 
2007). Traditionally, carry trades have been made by large financial institutions and leveraged institutions, 
such as hedge funds. Low exchange rate volatility and persistent interest rate differentials have fueled the 
growth in cross-currency positions in recent years (Galati, Heath and McGuire (2007)).   2 
have raised concerns about the resulting credit risks, especially in those situations where 
financiers are unable to assess the actual foreign currency needs of their borrowers. Indeed, 
a 2007 Report by the International Monetary Fund (Sorsa, Bakker, Duenwald, Maechler 
and Tiffin (2007)) warned that 
“Corporate foreign currency debt in (emerging) Europe is at levels similar to 
pre-crisis Asia and Latin America [… and] currency risks are amplified because 
much of the corporate foreign currency exposure seems unhedged. […] The 
drive of [foreign] banks to complement limited earnings opportunities at home 
with high profits from emerging Europe may have led to risk under-pricing. 
[…] This under-pricing may be compounded by limited data on 
creditworthiness and weak institutions.” 
 
The recent increase in foreign currency borrowing in Eastern Europe and the 
widespread policy concerns resulting therefrom have drawn considerable interest from 
academics and policy makers alike. However, all studies so far (to the best of our 
knowledge) have analyzed foreign currency borrowing at either the aggregate or the bank 
level.
2 These studies therefore cannot determine the extent to which foreign currency 
borrowing is carried out by firms or households. In contrast, this paper examines the 
currency denomination of individual retail loans in virtually all transition countries of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In particular, we focus on lending to small 
                                                 
2 Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2007), for example, examine aggregate data across 24 countries for the 
period 2000-2006 and find that access to international funding, exchange rate volatility and domestic inflation 
affect loan dollarization. Interest rate differentials seem less important. Rosenberg and Tirpak (2008) confirm 
that international funding is a key determinant of loan dollarization, while Luca and Petrova (2008) suggest 
that domestic deposits in foreign currency are also an important driver. However, these supply side 
explanations of foreign currency borrowing are questioned by Haiss, Paulhart and Rainer (2008) who find that 
foreign bank entry does not explain loan dollarization in 16 transition countries.   3 
businesses. Very little is known about the attraction and characteristics of borrowing in 
low-yielding currencies by this key segment of the economy. 
A number of recent theoretical papers have started to model the choice of loan 
currency in a way that may also be relevant for small firms (Allayannis, Brown and Klapper 
(2003)). Cowan (2006), for example, predicts that firms with more foreign income and 
firms in countries with a higher interest differential will have more foreign debt, but the 
match between income streams and denomination of debt is naturally tighter for more firms 
that could face higher distress costs in the event of default. 
We introduce an information asymmetry between banks and firms in a framework that 
also features a trade-off between the cost and risk of debt. We conjecture that banks do not 
necessarily know the currency in which firms have contracted their sales, and/or the firms' 
actual revenue levels. Information asymmetries between banks and firms underpin our 
modern understanding of financial intermediation (Freixas and Rochet (2008)). Information 
asymmetries concerning currency and revenues may be aggravated in developing and 
transition countries. Corporate law is weak in these countries, and it may be hard for banks 
to assess the credibility of available firm-level financial information. Firms can therefore 
often borrow without having any audited statements. Banks also can not verify firm sales 
information through advanced cash management services, which are yet to be introduced in 
many firms. Consequently, “soft” information may be the only type of information that is 
available, but foreign banks − which are widely present in developing and transition 
countries − may struggle to collect and use it (Stein (2002), Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta 
(2008)). 
If the interest rate on foreign currency funds is lower, local currency earners with low 
distress costs vis-à-vis the interest rate will differentially choose foreign currency loans. Our   4 
model shows that if the banks are imperfectly informed about the currency in which the 
firms earn, then more local earners switch to foreign currency loans, as the firms do not 
bear the full cost of the corresponding default risk. 
We test these implications of our theoretical model by investigating the currency 
denomination of individual bank loans granted to small firms. We use a 2005 survey of 
9,655 firms from 26 transition countries, which yields 3,105 actual bank loan observations 
in an synthetic panel running from January 2002:I to 2005:II. At the firm level, we find that 
small businesses that have foreign currency income or assets are more likely to borrow in 
foreign currency. In contrast, we find hardly any evidence that firm-level distress costs or 
financial transparency affect the decision to borrow in foreign versus local currency. At the 
country level, we find that interest rate differentials and exchange rate movements do not 
explain the differences in foreign currency borrowing. Instead, we find that foreign bank 
presence, weak corporate governance and the regulations on incoming international capital 
flows do help explain the large cross-country variation in foreign currency borrowing 
within our sample. 
In sum, while we do find some evidence for the trade-off between debt risk and cost 
having an influence on loan currency denomination, we cannot confirm that information 
asymmetries at the firm level and currency speculation are key driving forces of the recently 
observed increase in the dollarization of small business loans in Eastern European transition 
countries. Our findings on the proxies for country-level asymmetries, however, suggest that 
transparency-enhancing policy innovations can reduce foreign currency borrowing. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical and 
empirical literature. Section III introduces the main hypotheses, ingredients and specifics of   5 
our theoretical model. Section IV describes the data and the empirical model, while Section 
V discusses the firm- and country-specific empirical results. Section VI concludes. 
II. Literature 
A.  Theory 
A number of recent papers model the choice of the loan currency denomination by 
firms borrowing from financial institutions or investors (see Allayannis, Brown and 
Klapper (2003) for example for a pointed review). Managing the risk from economic 
exposure clearly matters in this choice: if the firm’s cash flows are in foreign currency, 
borrowing in the same foreign currency will provide a straightforward natural hedge 
(Goswami and Shrikhande (2001)).
3 
Firms may opt for the lowest cost debt, as static capital structure trade-off theory 
suggests. The interest rate differential, i.e., the deviations from the uncovered interest rate 
parity, is then the second main determinant of the firm's choice of loan currency 
denomination (Graham and Harvey (2001)).
4 
These two elements, i.e., the management of currency risk and the cost of debt, can be 
traded off as in Cowan (2006). His model predicts that firms with more foreign income and 
firms in countries with a higher interest differential (where foreign currency funds are 
cheaper) will have more foreign debt. His model further shows that firms that are more 
                                                 
3 Mian (1996), Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998), Brown (2001) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001), among 
others, analyze the hedging of foreign currency exposure, using forward contracts and derivatives for example. 
4 Our theoretical framework and accompanying empirical analysis will focus on small firms in emerging 
economies. Consequently, we do not discuss: (1) International taxation issues such as tax loss carry forwards 
and limitations on foreign tax credits; (2) The possibilities for international income shifting; (3) The 
differential costs across countries of derivatives to create synthetic local debt; and (4) Clientele effects in 
issuing public bonds. These issues are clearly important when analyzing the debt structure of large 
corporations.   6 
financially constrained (firms that experience a higher risk premium when borrowing from 
a bank) are more likely to match the denomination of debt to their income streams. These 
firms would have to borrow at higher costs if they become financially distressed due to the 
accumulated currency mismatches. If a bank knows a firm is mismatched, it may pass on 
the corresponding expected default costs immediately. 
The framework in Cowan (2006) is also relevant for small firms. Small firms that 
have earnings in foreign currencies can be expected to borrow in these foreign currencies. 
Very small and highly leveraged firms, on the other hand, may have less foreign currency 
debt because they have a higher risk of financial distress. Our own theoretical model 
features not only the trade-off between the risk and the cost of debt, present in Cowan 
(2006), but introduces a very specific but relevant information asymmetry between banks 
and firms. We conjecture that the banks do not know the currency in which the firms have 
contracted their sales. We motivate this conjecture further when we discuss our model. 
The information asymmetry for the financiers in Jeanne (2000) concerns the effort 
level of the exporting entrepreneurs. Exporters borrow locally in domestic or foreign 
currency. But borrowing in a foreign currency serves as a commitment device: The 
entrepreneurs have a stronger incentive for effort if they have foreign currency debt, 
because failure to achieve high returns is automatically sanctioned by termination. 
Consequently, lenders may require lower interest rates on foreign currency loans, and 
entrepreneurs may choose to borrow in foreign currency at equilibrium if the expected cost 
of early termination is more than offset by the lower interest rate that they obtain on foreign 
currency debt. 
In contrast to Jeanne (2000), in which firms have only foreign revenues, in our model 
firms have domestic or foreign currency earnings. In Jeanne (2000) entrepreneurial effort is   7 
unobservable to the financiers; in our model, the currency in which sales are contracted and 
sales revenues are collected cannot be observed by the bank. Finally, Jeanne (2000) focuses 
on the macro policy choices,
5 while our model focuses on firm decisions (which we can 
test, as we have access to firm-level data). 
B.  Empirical Work 
A number of studies analyze the currency denomination of debt of large corporations 
within a single country. Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) for example study large US 
corporations. These firms, according to their results, match loan to sales currencies. But 
they find no evidence that tax arbitrage, market liquidity, or legal regime affects the 
currency choice of these corporations. Keloharju and Niskanen (2001) study 44 large 
Finnish corporations and document not only currency matching, but also evidence of carry 
trade (i.e. borrowing in the low-interest rate currency). Large Chilean and Mexican 
corporations, for example, also engage in currency-matching (Benavente, Johnson and 
Morande (2003), Cowan, Hansen and Herrera (2005), Gelos (2003)). Clark and Judge 
(2007) critically review these and other studies. 
Not many studies have had access to the firm-level panel (country, time) data that is 
essential to investigate the link between loan currency denomination and firm 
                                                 
5 Domestic currency debt allows the policymaker in the model to insure the productive sector against bad 
shocks. If returns are low, the policymaker avoids terminations by setting the exchange rate at the lowest 
possible level. Macro explanations for corporate foreign currency debt seem less relevant for our sample: (1) 
The domestic financial markets in the local currency may be underdeveloped in liquidity (Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2003)) and offer only short maturity debt. The small firms in our sample, however, borrow 
mostly from banks. Bank loans typically have a short maturity (Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller 
(2005), Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008)). (2) Government may give free insurance to foreign currency 
borrowers through the fixed exchange rate regime or bail out. Foreign firm debt may even act as a disciplining 
device for local government as borrowers in foreign currency will be worse off after devaluation. Firms may 
not take into account this externality (Calvo (2001), Tirole (2003)), and our sample countries mostly have 
flexible exchange rate regimes. (3) Lenders may refuse to lend in the local currency, as they fear that 
devaluation by local government will decrease the value of their sovereign debt (the “original sin”).   8 
characteristics, controlling for macro and institutional variables. A study by Allayannis, 
Brown and Klapper (2003) is an exception. Following Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), Allayannis, Brown and Klapper 
(2003) investigate the capital structure of 327 of the largest East-Asian corporations, 
including foreign, local, and synthetic local (hedged) debt. They find that the ability to 
manage currency risk with risk management tools and the interest rate differentials, as well 
as the asset type, explain the use of foreign currency debt. A paper by Cowan (2006) 
investigating around 500 corporations in half a dozen Latin American countries arrives at 
similar findings (see also for example Esho, Sharpe and Webster (2007)). Finally, recent 
work by Kamil (2008) − using a new database with annual accounting information for over 
2,200 non-financial companies in seven Latin American countries − investigates the effect 
of various exchange rate regimes on firms’ incentives to hedge currency risk (see also 
Kamil and Sutton (2008)). 
Complementing these empirical studies, we investigate the currency denomination of 
recent individual bank loans granted to small firms, rather than the currency denomination 
of the outstanding corporate debt of large corporations. Informational asymmetries may 
play a more important role in small firms. Motivated by our theoretical framework, we 
focus on the interplay between firm-specific measures of firm distress costs and 
informational asymmetries. 
The dataset comprises survey data on 9,655 firms from 26 transition countries. While 
the transition in these countries may be interesting to study in its own right, what is more 
important for our purposes is that banks, small firms and the informational asymmetries 
between them play a key role in transition countries. In addition, the bank loans detailed in 
the dataset were granted during a period in which large changes in interest rate differentials,   9 
institutional arrangements and banking sector characteristics (e.g., foreign ownership) took 
place across the countries that are covered. Consequently, this dataset is well suited to 
studying the decisions made by firms about the currency denomination of their bank loans, 
based on a theoretical framework that highlights firm distress costs and informational 
asymmetries. We develop this framework in the next section. 
III.  Theory 
A.  Introduction 
Existing models demonstrate that firms' choice of loan denomination is affected by 
the structure of firm revenues, interest rate differentials between local and foreign currency 
funds, and the distress costs of firms facing potential default (see Jeanne (2000), 
Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003), and Cowan (2006) for example). Missing in the 
theoretical literature so far is a model of the likely interplay between distress costs and 
bank-firm informational asymmetries. 
We construct a simple model that clarifies how the choice of loan currency is 
determined by a firm’s distress costs and the bank’s lack of information about the firm’s 
revenues. Our model shows that if there is an interest rate differential in favor of foreign 
currency funds, all foreign currency earners will prefer foreign currency loans. In addition, 
all local currency earners with low distress costs and high revenues will also choose foreign 
currency loans. In contrast, local currency earning firms with high distress costs and low 
revenues will prefer local currency loans. If banks cannot identify either the currency or the 
level of the revenues of the firm, i.e. the “firm type”, then more local earners will borrow in 
foreign currency. Consequently, our model identifies the information asymmetry between   10 
lending banks and borrowing firms as a so far overlooked potential driver of “dollarization” 
in the credit markets. 
B.  Assumptions 
Define  t e , the exchange rate at time t, to equal the amount of local currency per unit 
of foreign currency, normalized at  0 = t  to  1 0 = e . At  1 = t , the local currency either 
appreciates to  1 < A e , with probability  p , or it depreciates to  1 > D e , with probability 
p − 1 . We assume that 1 ) 1 ( = − + D A e p e p , so that the expected exchange rate at  1 = t  
equals  1
*











A firm needs to invest  1 = I  in local currency at  0 = t  to receive any revenues at 
1 = t . Firms differ in their revenue structure. There are three types of firms, foreign (F ), 
good local (LG) and bad local (LB ) currency earners. Foreign currency earners have 
revenue 
F R in foreign currency, which equals the expected revenue in local currency as the 
expected exchange rate equals one ( 1
*
1 = e , hence 
F F R e R =
*
1 ). The other two types of 
firms have local currency earnings. The good local currency earners have high earnings 
LG R  in local currency, while the bad local currency earners have low earnings in local 
currency, 
LG LB R R < . We abstract from the possibility that foreign currency earners may 
differ in their income levels, as it does not alter the main insights of our model.
7 
                                                 
6 As we assume that the level of firm revenues does not change with the exchange rate, the changes in the 
exchange rate in our model are assumed to be real. 
7 Under perfect information, all foreign currency earners would take foreign currency loans at the same 
interest rate independent of their revenue level. With asymmetric information about firm revenues, this result 
also holds under reasonable assumptions on firm-level distress costs (see Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2008)).   11 
Let all firm types be physically located in the domestic country. Their owners will 
spend their profits locally, so firms care about their expected payoff in local currency. Firms 
maximize their expected income and have no other wealth (and are thus limited liable).
8 
Banks set prices simultaneously. When they can identify firm type, they charge a net 
interest rate 
j
k r  on a loan in foreign or local currencyk ,  } ; { l f k∈ , to a firm of type 
} ; ; { LG LB F j∈ . Banks have no capacity limits on foreign or local currency funds. We 
normalize the cost of foreign currency funds to  0 = f i  and set the unit cost of local currency 
funds to  l i . We assume that the uncovered interest parity condition (UIP) is not fulfilled, 
and that there is an interest rate advantage to foreign currency funding for the bank, i.e. 
0 = ∆ + > e i i f l . Extensive empirical research, using a variety of methods, has found finds 
that the uncovered interest rate parity condition rarely holds.
9 
Interest payments are made upfront at  0 = t , and the loan repayment is made at 
1 = t .
10 Firms' earnings are verifiable ex post, so that payments are enforceable if a firm has 
sufficient earnings. 
We assume that the exchange rate volatility is such that bad local currency earners 
will always default if they take a loan in foreign currency and the local currency depreciates, 
i.e.  D
LB e R < .
11 We also assume that all good local currency earners have high enough 
                                                 
8 While we assume that firms maximize expected income, their payoff is not linear in expected income when 
we assume distress costs. The assumption of distress costs implies that firms care about income variance, as 
would be the case if we assumed firms were risk-averse. 
9 For surveys of this literature, see Hodrick (1987), Froot and Thaler (1990), Lewis (1995), Engel (1996), and 
Isard (2006). 
10 Given our focus, we do not derive the optimality of this debt contract (see Townsend (1979) for example). 
11 It is not uncommon for small firms to default on loans in foreign currency following a deep depreciation of 
the local currency, for example in developing countries (Ziaul Hoque (2003)). Small firms and firms in 
developing countries rarely use derivatives to hedge their net currency exposure (Briggs (2004), Børsum and 
Ødegaard (2005), and O'Connell (2005), among others).   12 
revenues that they will always be able to pay back their loan regardless of the exchange rate 
movements, i.e.  D
LG e R > . Moreover, we assume that foreign currency earners have 








If firms default on a loan, they face costs of financial distress. For example, defaulters 
can henceforth find external financing only at penalty costs, as in Cowan (2006). In this 
case, the distress costs C  may be proportional to or convex in the default amount (though 
still homogenous across firms). Alternatively, these costs may involve the private value to 
its owner of a firm that is lost in bankruptcy (for example, in the case of small and family-
owned firms (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993))).
12 In this case, C  will be independent of 
the default amount, but will be heterogeneous among firms. Given that our empirical 
analysis focuses on small and predominantly family-owned firms, we assume that distress 
costs (in local currency units) are constant per firm but distributed uniformly on the range 
[ ] C C Ci , ∈  for all firms i  of type  } ; ; { LG LB F j∈ . 
Given the above assumptions, the payoff 
j
k v  in local currency to a firm of type  j  
taking a loan of type  k  equals 
[1] 
{ } ( )





= − − − −
= ∈ + −
=
f LB k) j r C p e R p










,   , (   if ) 1 (
,   , ( or       if ) 1 (
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12 Corresponding to the risk aversion of managers, as in Stulz (1984), or of firms, as in Conesa (1997) and 
Calvo (2001), for example.   13 
C.  Perfect Information 
We first analyze bank and firm behavior when banks are perfectly informed about the 
type of each firm. Under this assumption, each bank sets six interest rates. For each of the 
three firm types  } ; ; { F LB LG j∈ , they set two interest rates, depending on whether a 
foreign or local currency loan is offered. 
The expected profits of banks in local currency from each loan type are 
[2] 
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. 
Assuming perfect price competition, the expected profit on each loan type will be 
zero. Given our assumption that  0 = f i , this leads to the following equilibrium interest 
rates: 
[3]  { }









f) , (LB k) (j, R e p
f   k F;LG j 







  if 1
  and      if 0
     and    } ; ; {   if
. 
The equilibrium interest rates displayed in [3] are straightforward to interpret: banks 
will charge firms for their funding costs. In addition, if a bad local currency earner takes a 
loan in foreign currency, the bank charges that bad firm for the expected credit risk due to 
the potential exchange rate movements. 
Inserting the equilibrium interest rates from [3] into [1], we obtain the following 
results: foreign currency earners (F  types) always choose foreign currency loans. They do 
so because there is an interest rate advantage to foreign currency loans and they do not run 
the risk of incurring distress costs when taking such a loan. For the same reason, all good 
local currency earning firms (LG types) also choose foreign currency loans. In contrast,   14 
bad local currency earning firms (LB  types) face a trade-off: if they choose a foreign 
currency loan they benefit from an interest rate advantage, but they may incur distress costs 
if the exchange rate depreciates. The condition for LB firms to choose a local currency loan 
is 
[4]  l i i C p ≥ − ) 1 ( . 
From condition [4], we can derive that the marginal LB  firm that will choose a local 
currency loan is the one with distress costs equal to 








info perfect  . 
All LB  firms with lower distress costs will choose foreign currency loans. We 
assumed that the distress costs are distributed uniformly on  [ ] C C Ci , ∈ . As a result we 





















































info perfect  δ . 
To summarize, if there is an interest rate differential in favor of foreign currency 
funds, under perfect information all foreign currency earners will prefer foreign currency 
loans. In addition, all local currency earners with low distress costs or high revenues also 
choose foreign currency loans. Only local currency earning firms with high distress costs 
and low revenues choose local currency loans.   15 
D.  Imperfect Information 
We now introduce an information asymmetry between banks and firms about the 
revenues of the firms. Our model allows for two dimensions of information asymmetry. 
First, banks may not be able to verify the currency denomination of firm revenues, i.e., 
banks may not be able to distinguish F  firms from the joint pool of LG and LB  firms. A 
lack of information about the currencies that are employed by the firms may correspond to 
the real situation for many banks, especially in transition / developing countries and for 
small firms. In general, the currency denomination of a firm’s current and future sales 
contracts is often negotiated,
13 and consequently may be a closely guarded secret. Second, 
banks may not be able to verify the level of revenues of local currency earners, i.e., to 
distinguish LG from LB  firms. This corresponds to the commonly made assumption in 
small enterprise finance that it is difficult for banks to distinguish good from bad firms. In 
both cases, banks may have difficulties or lack incentives to collect detailed information 
about firm revenues, depending on bank type, size or ownership and the degree of 
competition in the banking sector. These costs of information acquisition are also 
particularly high when dealing with small firms, which are less likely to have audited 
financial accounts (Berger and Udell (1998)).
14 
                                                 
13 See Friberg and Wilander (2008) for example. This may be a consequence of firm risk aversion (Viaene and 
de Vries (1992)). Currency variability (Engel (2006) among others) and medium of exchange considerations 
(Rey (2001)) may also determine currency choice. 
14 Banks may lack information on firm quality, project choice, or managerial effort, for example, incurring 
monitoring costs (Diamond (1984), Diamond (1991)) or forming relationships with the firms (Sharpe (1990), 
Rajan (1992), von Thadden (2004), Hauswald and Marquez (2006), Egli, Ongena and Smith (2006), or Black 
(2006), among others). Foreign banks may be less informed about the activities of local firms (Rueda Maurer 
(2008), Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta (2008), Giannetti and Ongena (2008) and Giannetti and Ongena 
(2008)), while intense competition between banks may make relationship banking more or less beneficial 
(Petersen and Rajan (1995), Boot and Thakor (2000), Elsas (2005) and Degryse and Ongena (2007)).   16 
Information asymmetries concerning both currency and level of revenues are 
aggravated in developing and transition countries, where due to the weak corporate legal 
system, it is hard for banks to assess the credibility of available firm-level financial 
information (Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000), Brown, Jappelli and Pagano (2008)). As a 
result, firms in developing and transition countries often borrow without having any audited 
statements (e.g., Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier (2000)), and banks cannot verify firm sales 
information through advanced cash management services, for example. Indeed, advanced 
cash management services are yet to be introduced in many of these countries, either 
because banks do not offer (e.g., Tsamenyi and Skliarova (2005)) or firms do not demand 
them (for example, in the survey we analyze, one third of the firms report receiving less 
than one third of their income through their banks). Hence, “soft” information may be the 
only type of information that is available. But the large and foreign banks that are widely 
present in developing and transition countries may have problems collecting and using soft 
information (Stein (2002), Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta (2008)). 
We therefore assume in the following that banks can neither verify the currency 
denomination nor the level of revenues of a firm, i.e., banks cannot distinguish F  from 
LG from LB type firms. We assume that banks know that some given proportion  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ λ  
of the total firm population are LB  firms, and that the remaining proportion  λ − 1  are either 
F  or LG firms. The bank does not need to separate F  from LG firms, as from the 
previous section we know that these two types never default on any loan, and thus should 
both receive the same (risk-free) interest rate on either a local or foreign currency loan. 
We assume that all banks are equally affected by the information asymmetry, 
regardless of the currency in which they lend. This assumption corresponds to the situation 
in the financial sector in Eastern Europe, for example, where most domestic and foreign   17 
banks are observed to offer loans in both local and foreign currency to local firms. The 
assumption centers our model on the variation in firm type, simplifying the interpretation of 
its findings. 
In contrast, in international renditions of the pecking order hypothesis,
15 or in models 
with costly monitoring and an agency cost of debt,
16 local and foreign financiers are 
different, for example in terms of monitoring cost or level of scrutiny, and are likely to lend 
only in their own currency. However it is not clear that these international extensions of 
pecking order or monitoring models, whereby banks lend only or primarily in their own 
currency, apply unequivocally to most small firms in many countries. Indeed, the small 
firms in our sample borrow locally in local and foreign currencies from both domestically 
and foreign-owned banks. 
Recall that under perfect information, all F  and LG firms take foreign currency 
loans and are charged a zero interest rate. In contrast, among LB  firms, only those firms 
with low distress costs take foreign currency loans, and these firms are charged a non-zero 
interest rate due to their positive default risk. We now show that under imperfect 
information, LB  firms do not bear the full costs of their default risk and thus are more 
inclined to take foreign currency loans. 
With imperfect information concerning the currency and level of revenues, banks can 
no longer condition their interest rates on firm types. Banks thus only offer two rates:  l r  for 
                                                 
15 Under the pecking order hypothesis, local financiers have better information about the firm than foreign 
financiers. If all financiers lend only in their own currency, firms will borrow first in the local and then in the 
foreign currency, after having exhausted internal funds. 
16 Firms with high monitoring costs, in Diamond (1984), for example, should borrow more locally in the local 
currency. If borrowing abroad, in the foreign currency, entails more regulatory scrutiny, hence distress costs, 
better firms in Ross (1977) will borrow in the foreign currency to signal their quality. In Jeanne (1999) and 
Besancenot and Vranceanu (2004) foreign debt is more expensive and firms signal that they are not fragile by 
engaging in ‘excessive’ borrowing in the foreign currency. In Titman and Trueman (1986), foreign lenders are 
of a higher quality.   18 
local currency loans and  f r  for foreign currency loans. In this case, the expected profits of 
banks in local currency from the two loan types are 
[7] 
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where  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ δ  is the equilibrium share of LB  firms taking foreign currency loans. In 
equilibrium, and with zero expected profit, interest rates must equal: 
[8] 
























The interest rate charged on foreign currency loans covers the expected losses due to 
default on such loans. Under imperfect information, this depends on the share of LB  firms 
taking such loans relative to F  and LG firms. Note that the interest rate that lenders 
charge on foreign currency loans lies between the rates it charges for such loans under 
perfect information to F  and LG firms, i.e. 0, and LB  firms, i.e.  [ ]
LB
f f r r , 0 ∈ . 
Note that in [7] and [8] we assume that in equilibrium all F  and LG firms take 
foreign currency loans under imperfect information. From [1] we know that this will be the 
case as long as the equilibrium interest rate on foreign currency loans is lower than that on 
local currency loans, i.e.  l f r r < . At the end of this section, we discuss the conditions under 
which this is the case. 




f C i v C r v ≥  will choose foreign 
currency loans. From [1] and [8] we see that this will be the case for all LB  firms with 
distress costs not higher than:   19 
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where the share of bad local currency earning firms taking foreign currency loans is 









info imperfect  δ . Note that 
LB LB C C info perfect  info imperfect  > . 
From [9], we can establish that the lowest interest rate  l i  at which LB  firms opt for 
foreign currency loans is  ( )( ) D
LB
l e R C p i − + − = 1 . We assume from now on that 
[10]  0 > − ≥
LB
D R e C . 
This assumption ensures that unless there is a positive interest rate differential to the 
advantage of foreign currency funds, all LB  firms will choose local currency loans. This 
assumption negates the possibility that some LB  firms choose foreign currency loans due 
to their limited liability even in the absence of an interest rate differential. We can further 
establish from [9] that for all interest rate levels  ( ) ( )( ) [ ]
LB
D l R e C p i − − − − ≥ λ 1 1 , all LB  
firms will choose foreign currency loans. For interest rate levels in the range 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ]
LB
D l D
LB R e C p i e R C p − − − − < < − + − λ 1 1 1 , a certain proportion  1 0 < < δ  of 
LB  firms will choose foreign currency loans under imperfect information. 
We now establish that for each interest rate level in this range, there is a unique 
marginal firm that takes a foreign currency loan, and that this firm is characterized by 
higher distress costs under imperfect information than under perfect information: 
LB l LB C
p
i




As the left hand side of [9] is increasing and continuous in 
LB C info imperfect   and the right 
hand side is decreasing and continuous in 
LB C info imperfect  , there is at most one level of   20 








info imperfect  , the 
left hand side is less than the right hand side. As a consequence, a unique equilibrium 
exists, 
LB l LB C
p
i
C info perfect  info imperfect  1
=
−
> , if for  C C
LB = info imperfect   (and  1 = δ ) the right hand side 
of the condition is smaller than the left hand side. This is the case for all 
( ) ( )( ) [ ]
LB
D l R e C p i − − − − < λ 1 1 , and thus for the range of interest rates under 
consideration. 
We can now characterize the share of LB  firms that take foreign currency loans under 
imperfect information as follows: 
[11]
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info perfect  info imperfect  . 
Comparing conditions [11] and [6] we can conclude that more local currency 
earners will choose foreign currency loans under imperfect information than under perfect 
information. 
We have assumed throughout this section that all F  and LG firms choose foreign 
currency loans in equilibrium. From [1], we know that this will be the case as long as the 
equilibrium interest rate on local currency loans is higher than that on foreign currency 
loans. From [8] we see that this will be the case as long as the interest rate differential to the 
advantage of foreign currency funds is 
[12]  ( )( )
LB
D l R e p i − − ≥ 1 . 
Due to our assumption in [10], this condition is met in any equilibrium under 
imperfect information where LB  firms choose foreign currency loans.   21 
E.  Empirical Predictions 
1.  Firm Level 
Our model above yields several testable hypotheses regarding firm-level choice of 
loan denomination. We predict that the likelihood of choosing a foreign currency loan is 
positively related to the share of income a firm earns in foreign currency. Under the 
assumptions of our model, all foreign currency earners choose foreign currency loans, so 
the proportion of foreign currency earners taking foreign currency loans is always at least as 
high as that of local currency earners. 
However, our model shows that not only the currency denomination of a firm’s cash 
flow is important, but also the magnitude of its cash flows compared to its potential loan 
repayments. Among firms with local currency earnings, firms with large revenues compared 
to their credit obligations are more likely to take foreign currency loans. 
As predicted by existing models (Jeanne (2000), Allayannis, Brown and Klapper 
(2003), and Cowan (2006) for example), the choice of a foreign currency loan should 
further be negatively related to the firm-level distress costs. The impact of distress costs on 
loan denomination should be stronger the lower the share of income a firm receives in 
foreign currency and the lower the revenue. 
A key prediction of our model is that the choice of a foreign currency loan by local 
currency earners should be positively related to the opaqueness of the firm's revenue 
structure. More local currency earners choose foreign currency loans under imperfect 
information than under perfect information. The impact of information opaqueness is 
stronger for firms with higher shares of revenue in local currency (our model suggests that 
imperfect information does not alter the currency choice for firms with foreign currency 
earnings only).   22 
2.  Country Level 
At the macroeconomic level, our model predicts that the choice of a foreign currency 
loan will be positively related to the interest rate advantage on foreign currency funds. The 
impact of the interest rate differential, however, does depend on firm characteristics. The 
reaction to an increase in the interest rate differential should be stronger for firms with less 
income in foreign currency. 
The choice of a foreign currency loan will further be negatively related to exchange 
rate volatility. If the local currency is more likely to depreciate, local currency earners (with 
low revenues) will be less likely to take a foreign currency loan. Moreover the impact of 
exchange rate volatility should be stronger for those firms with higher distress costs. 
Finally, our model suggests that characteristics of the banking sector or of the legal 
environment that exacerbate information asymmetries between banks and firms may foster 
unhedged foreign currency borrowing. The following is a summary of the model 
predictions:   23 
 
Effect of determinants of the choice of a foreign currency loan 
(+): positive effect, (-): negative effect) 
    Firm level determinants   
% Income in foreign currency  (+) 
   
Distress costs  (-) 
% Income in foreign currency * Distress costs  (+) 
Opaqueness of revenues  (+) 
% Income in foreign currency * Opaqueness of revenues  (-) 
    Country level determinants   
Interest rate differential (local minus foreign)  (+) 
% Income in foreign currency * Interest rate differential   (-) 
Exchange rate volatility  (-) 
Distress costs * Exchange rate volatility  (-) 
Banking sector or legal impediments to transparency  (+) 
 
 
IV.  Data 
Firm-level loan information was obtained from the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the World Bank jointly conducted this survey in 1999, 2002 and 
2005. Our analysis is based on the 2005 version, as it contains the most comprehensive 
information on the borrowing behavior of the firms. 
First, we relate this information to firm-level indicators of revenue sources, distress 
costs and opaqueness taken from the same survey. Then we relate our firm-level loan 
information to country-level indicators of macroeconomic conditions, as well as 
characteristics of the banking sector and institutional environment, taken from the   24 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Annual Reports on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions (AREAER) compiled by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Transition Report published by the EBRD, and Basso, Calvo-
Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2007). The definitions and data sources for all variables used in our 
empirical analysis are presented in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
A.  Firm-Level Borrowing Behavior 
BEEPS 2005 provides data on 9,655 firms in 26 transition countries and covers a 
representative sample of firms for each of these countries.
17 In this sample, 4,062 firms 
report detailed information on their most recent loan. Most important for our analysis, the 
survey includes an indicator of the currency denomination of the loan. Each firm states 
whether its most recent loan was denominated in local or foreign currency. The answer to 
this question is our dependent variable Forex loan, which takes the value one if the most 
recent loan was denominated in a foreign currency and zero if the most recent loan was in 
local currency. The survey further lists the precise date the loan was received and 
information on collateralization, duration, and interest rate. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics on the characteristics of loans in our sample by 
country. We exclude all observations for which the firm did not indicate the currency 
denomination (346 observations) and for which loans were received earlier than January 
2002.
18 We are left with 3,105 observations. In this sample, 25% of the loans are 
                                                 
17 The survey covers all countries in which the EBRD is operational, with the exception of Turkmenistan. See 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/beeps.htm for detailed information on BEEPS 2005. 
18 Rejections of loan applications may create a selection issue that may vary across quarters. We do not have 
any information on loan applications, and hence have to assume the choice of currency is unaffected.   25 
denominated in foreign currency. However, the percentage of foreign currency loans varies 
significantly across countries, from less than 10% in the Czech Republic, the Slovak 
Republic, Bosnia, and Uzbekistan to more than 50% in Albania and Georgia. 
[Table 2 here] 
The average loan duration in our sample is 29 months, again with considerable 
variation across countries. The overwhelming majority of loans in most countries are 
collateralized, with only four countries having collateralization rates of less than 80%. In 
contrast, the mean ratio of the amount of collateral to loan size varies substantially across 
countries, from less than 100% in Slovenia and Uzbekistan to more than 200% in Bosnia. 
Not surprisingly for our sample of transition countries, the cost of credit is substantial: the 
mean (nominal) interest rate exceeds 14% per annum. Pairwise correlations displayed in 
Panel C of the table suggest that the loan currency denomination is related to other loan 
characteristics. Foreign currency loans have a longer average duration and, not surprisingly 
for the countries covered, lower interest rates than local currency loans. 
B.  Firm-Level Determinants of Loan Currency Denomination 
We start our empirical analysis by studying the firm-level determinants of loan 
currency choice. In our empirical model, the dependent variable  t j i ForexLoan , , ) Pr( is the 
probability that a firm of type i in country j chooses a foreign currency denomination when 
receiving a loan at time t: 
[14]  t j i t j i i t j t j i L F ForexLoan , , , , , , , 2 1 ) Pr( ε β β α + ⋅ + ⋅ + = . 
Our theoretical model suggests that a firm's decision to take a foreign currency loan 
should be related to the currency denomination of its revenues, the expected distress costs if 
it were to default on the bank loan, and the financial transparency of its activities. Our   26 
empirical model therefore includes a vector of firm-level indicators ( i F ) from BEEPS 2005 
that captures the corresponding firm-level characteristics.
19 
1.  Revenue Currency 
We use three indicators of a firm's revenue currency denomination. The dummy 
variable Exporter equals one if the firm exports and zero if the firm obtains revenues only 
from domestic sales. In countries where domestic sales are conducted exclusively in 
domestic currency, we believe that this dummy variable is a good indicator of whether a 
firm has foreign currency income or not. 
However, many of the countries in our sample display a strong degree of 
"dollarization", i.e., many domestic transactions are also conducted in foreign currency. To 
take this into account, we include a firm-level indicator of the extent of domestic sales in 
foreign currency. The variable Sales to multinationals equals one if the firm makes 
domestic sales to multinational or foreign-owned companies. Such sales are more likely to 
be made in foreign currency. 
Finally, in addition to current sales, assets in foreign currency could be an additional 
potential source of foreign currency cash flows. The BEEPS survey does not provide us 
with detailed information on the asset structure of firms. We therefore use foreign firm 
ownership as an indicator of whether firms have assets that yield foreign currency cash 
flow. The variable Foreign firm equals one if more than 50% of the firm's ownership is in 
                                                 
19 These characteristics are taken to be those prevailing at the time of the interview (in 2005) or for the 12 
months prior to the interview. For most firms, this implies that our firm-level explanatory variables are elicited 
after their most recent choice of loan currency. However, our theory also suggests that it is the expected firm 
characteristics (in particular, income currency and its verifiability, and distress costs) at the time of loan 
repayment − and not necessarily at the time of loan disbursement − which drive the currency choice. For a 
subset of 506 firms we have access to the firm-level characteristics from the 2002 BEEPS survey. We 
replicated our full-sample firm-level analysis using these 2002 values instead of the 2005 values We found no 
significant correlations between the 2002 firm characteristics and their choice of loan currency.   27 
foreign hands, and zero otherwise. Foreign-owned firms are more likely to have foreign 
currency loans, as they are more likely to have foreign currency income. 
2.  Distress Costs 
We include three indicators of distress costs that occur when firms default on their 
most recent bank loan. Expected distress costs are higher for entrepreneurs deriving more 
private intangible value from their firm. This value may be lost if these firms default. 
Expecting that this private value is higher for sole proprietorships or family owned 
businesses, we include the variable Family firm. This dummy variable equals one if the firm 
is a sole proprietorship or a family owned business, and zero otherwise. 
A further indicator of private intangible value is the variable Security costs, which 
measures the percentage of annual sales that firms pay for security-related services. We 
surmise that the private value of running a business may be lower in a less secure 
environment, and thus in an environment where security costs are higher. 
Theory finally suggests that highly leveraged firms have higher distress costs, as they 
face higher costs of accessing additional external finance (Cowan (2006)). Our final 
indicator of distress costs, Debt, therefore relies on a measure of firm leverage available 
from BEEPS 2005, namely the share of working capital financed by debt in the 12 months 
prior to the interview. 
3.  Opaqueness 
Our theoretical model suggests that loan denomination may further be related to the 
degree of opaqueness about the firms' revenue sources. If banks cannot identify the currency 
or level of firm revenues, our theory suggests that some local currency earners may pretend 
to be foreign exchange earners in order to receive cheaper foreign currency credit. As a   28 
result, firm opaqueness may lead to a higher probability of local currency earners taking 
foreign currency loans if a corresponding interest rate advantage exists. Note, however, that 
firm opaqueness may not lead to more foreign currency borrowing when we consider the 
full sample of firms. First, if in addition to firms with non-verifiable revenues there are 
some firms that have verifiable foreign currency earnings, then we could observe a positive 
relationship between foreign currency borrowing and financial transparency, as banks offer 
foreign currency loans to transparent firms at lower rates than to opaque firms. 
Furthermore, severe information asymmetry could lead to a collapse of the foreign currency 
credit market for those firms with non-verifiable revenues. In this case only transparent 
firms with foreign currency income would receive foreign currency loans. 
We include two firm-level indicators of opaqueness in our analysis. Our first indicator 
is based on firms' financial reporting standards. The variable Audited firm equals one for all 
firms with an external auditor and equals zero otherwise. Our conjecture is that firms with 
audited accounts are in a position to provide more credible information about their revenue 
sources to banks. Our second indicator of firm opaqueness, Income via bank, measures the 
share of the firm’s sales that are settled through a bank account. We expect that the higher 
this share, the better banks are informed about the revenue sources of the firms (à la 
Mester, Nakamura and Renault (2007) and Norden and Weber (2007)). 
4.  Control Variables 
In addition to our indicators of firm revenue, distress costs and opaqueness, we 
include three firm variables and sector fixed effects to control for any other differences in   29 
firm characteristics.
20 The variable International accounting equals one for all firms that 
apply international accounting standards (IAS or US GAAP), and equals zero otherwise. 
Firms with stronger relations to foreign markets or investors are more likely to apply 
international accounting standards. At the same time, adhering to international accounting 
standards makes firms more transparent. 
The variable Small firm equals one for firms with less than 50 employees and equals 
zero otherwise. Distress costs related to foreign currency borrowing may be larger for small 
firms, at least in proportion to loan size (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993)). On the other 
hand, small firms may also be more opaque. 
Finally, we include firm Age, measured at the time of disbursement of the most recent 
loan. The information about the firm’s activities may become more accurate and credible as 
the firm grows older and can provide a longer public track record. On the other hand, 
because of the transition in the countries we consider, age may also proxy for export 
income, ownership and financial transparency. 
We further include two characteristics of each loan ( t j i L , , ). The variable Duration 
measures the duration of the loan in months at origination, while the variable Collateralized 
equals one if the loan is collateralized, and zero otherwise. We assume banks determine 
duration and collateral prior to currency. However, dropping both loan variables does not 
alter our findings. 
                                                 
20 We classify each firm into one of the following seven sectors based on where it obtains the largest 
percentage of its revenues: Mining; Construction; Manufacturing; Transport and communication; Wholesale, 
retain and repairs; Real estate; and Hotels and restaurants.   30 
5.  Summary Statistics 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for our firm-level explanatory variables (statistics 
for the two loan characteristics were already provided in Table 2). The table displays the 
full sample means for each variable, and then compares means for the firms with local / 
foreign currency loans. The table suggests that firms with foreign currency loans differ 
systematically from those with local currency loans. As expected firms with foreign 
currency loans are much likely to have export income, sales to multinationals, and foreign 
owners. Note, however, that less than half (43 percent) of the firms with foreign currency 
loans have export income. This finding suggests that many firms that are taking foreign 
currency loans may be unhedged. 
[Table 3 here] 
Table 3 further shows that firms with foreign currency loans make higher 
expenditures for security services, suggesting that their distress costs may lower. On the 
other hand, there seems to be little difference in levels of family ownership and external 
debt between local currency and foreign currency borrowers. 
Our summary statistics suggest an ambiguous relation between financial transparency 
and currency denomination. On the one hand, firms with foreign currency loans are more 
likely to be audited. On the other hand, these firms have a lower share of their income 
flowing through bank accounts, suggesting less financial transparency. Finally, firms taking 
foreign currency loans are more likely to adhere to international accounting standards, but 
are also smaller and younger. 
Panel B displays the pairwise correlations between the firm characteristics. While 
some of the revenue indicators are somewhat correlated, not unexpectedly, this is not the   31 
case for the variables Security costs and Debt. Both variables are surprisingly uncorrelated 
with measures of currency revenue, Family firm, and the two transparency variables. 
Our theoretical model predicts that the choice of loan denomination for a given firm 
will differ across countries depending on the extent of the interest rate advantage of foreign 
currency funds and the exchange rate volatility. In addition, loan denomination may vary 
across countries due to differences in expectations of future macroeconomic conditions 
(domestic inflation volatility) as well as characteristics of the banking sector and the 
institutional environment (see the next section for a detailed discussion). In our analysis of 
firm-level determinants of loan denomination, we control for these cross-country 
differences by introducing country-time fixed effects ( t j, α ). 
C.  Country-Level Determinants of Loan Currency Denomination 
In a second empirical step, we examine the extent to which country-specific 
characteristics help explain the choice of loan currency in our sample. To do so we augment 
our empirical model with a vector of time-varying country-level variables ( t j C , ): 
[15]  t j i t j t j i i j t j i C L F Forexloan , , , , , , , 3 2 1 ) Pr( ε β β β α + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = . 
As not all country-specific characteristics are available for all countries and all 
quarters, in this second step we rely on varying subsamples. 
1.  Macroeconomic Determinants 
Our main country-level explanatory variable is an indicator of the interest rate 
differential between local currency and foreign currency funds. We use four indicators of 
the nominal interest rate differential. Our first two indicators are calculated using 
benchmark interest rates in the domestic and foreign financial sectors. We label our first 
measure the Interest differential – USD indicator, because we calculate it using the   32 
domestic Treasury bill rate (taken from IFS, line 60c), and the interest rate on US Treasury 
bills (IFS, line 60c), for the past quarter.
21 The Interest differential – Euro indicator is 
similarly calculated as the domestic interest rate minus the Eurepo rate (also taken from 
IFS). Our two further indicators of the interest rate differential are taken from Basso, Calvo-
Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2007). They obtain actual interest rate differentials between local 
currency and foreign currency, by surveying central banks in transition economies. Their 
survey allows them to compile monthly information on interest rate differentials on loans 
and deposits for 24 transition countries over the period 2000-2006. Unfortunately, their 
direct measures of interest rate differentials are not available for all countries throughout the 
whole observation period. We nevertheless use their indicators, which we label Interest 
differential – loans and Interest differential – deposits, where possible. 
As elaborated in our theory section, foreign currency borrowing should be driven by 
interest rate differentials after taking into account expected changes in the exchange rate. 
Firms should care about departures from uncovered interest parity, which constitute a real 
differentials in interest rates between local currency and foreign currency funds. 
Unfortunately, we have no measure of expected depreciation for our sample of countries. 
We therefore control for expected depreciation using the realized nominal depreciation of 
the local currency versus the US dollar (Depreciation – USD) or euro (Depreciation – 
Euro) during the past quarter (taken from IFS). 
Our theory suggests that local currency earning firms will be less likely to take foreign 
currency loans when exchange rate volatility is high. We include two variables that measure 
the actual variance of month on month changes per currency in the real exchange rate vis-à-
                                                 
21 Where a Treasury bill rate was not available, we used the central bank reference rate or money market rate 
available from IFS.    33 
vis the US dollar (Depreciation volatility – USD) and the euro (Depreciation volatility –
USD) respectively (again taken from IFS). We take the actual variance in exchange rate 
movements for the past 12 months prior to each quarter. In addition to our measure of 
actual exchange rate volatility, we include two measures of the exchange rate regime, which 
may affect agents’ expectations. We distinguish countries with a fixed exchange rate (Peg), 
i.e. those with a currency board, fixed peg or crawling peg, from those with a floating 
exchange rate regime. Our classification of exchange rate regimes is based on the IMF’s 
“Annual report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions” (AREAER). 
Further, affiliation with the European Union may shape expectations about future currency 
arrangements, as new member states are automatically on track to join the Euro-zone. We 
therefore distinguish those countries that have completed negotiations to join the European 
Union (EU) from those that have not. A pegged exchange rate and expected EU accession 
may spur foreign currency borrowing. 
In our model we ignore uncertainty about domestic inflation. In reality, however, 
volatility in the purchasing power of the local currency may affect borrowers’ loan choice. 
In a model of optimal portfolio choice, Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003), for example, show that 
risk-averse borrowers will choose the currency composition of their liabilities taking into 
account the relative volatility of domestic inflation and the real exchange rate. As we 
predict above, foreign currency borrowing should decrease with volatility in the exchange 
rate. Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003), however, also show that foreign currency borrowing 
should increase with volatility of domestic inflation. We account for this by including in our 
models the variable Inflation volatility, which measures the variance of month on month 
changes in the domestic consumer price index (also taken from IFS).   34 
2.  Banking Sector and Institutional Variables 
Our model predicts that the ability of local currency earners to borrow in foreign 
currency will be affected by the information of banks on the firm’s sources of revenues. 
This information will not only depend on the firm-level transparency, but also on bank 
characteristics and the institutional environment in which the bank operates. Foreign-owned 
banks may have less knowledge about the activities of local firms (see, Detragiache, Tressel 
and Gupta (2008), Giannetti and Ongena (2008) and Giannetti and Ongena (2008) for 
example). As a first indicator of countrywide information asymmetries, we include a 
variable that captures the foreign presence in the banking sector. The variable Foreign 
banks measures the asset share of foreign controlled banks on a yearly basis per country, 
and is taken from the EBRD transition report. Informational asymmetries in the banking 
sector may also be affected by the extent to which domestic corporate law promotes good 
corporate governance. We therefore include the EBRD Enterprise reform index, which 
measures on a yearly basis the degree to which corporate governance meets international 
standards in each transition country. 
We expect that the probability of a firm taking a foreign currency loan should be 
naturally related to the degree of real "dollarization" in its country. We include two country-
level explanatory variables that measure the degree to which the foreign currency is used in 
the local economy. Our first indicator is the share of banking deposits that are held in 
foreign currency (Forex deposits), taken from Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2007). 
Our second measure of real dollarization is the dummy variable CIS, which equals one for 
all countries that are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States from the former 
Soviet Union. Existing aggregate evidence by Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2007)   35 
and Luca and Petrova (2008) suggests that real dollarization is substantially higher in these 
countries in the former Soviet Union than in other Eastern European transition countries. 
The demand for foreign currency loans may further be influenced by firms’ access to 
other currency hedging instruments. While we believe that the use of currency derivatives 
should be limited in our sample of firms, we nevertheless include a measure of the 
availability of such instruments. The dummy variable Forward fx market captures whether 
(or not) the forward currency market is well developed in a country, and is taken from the 
IMF’s AREAER publication. 
Regulations on capital flows may limit the supply of foreign currency loans by 
domestic banks. Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2007) and Luca and Petrova (2008) 
find that banks’ access to foreign funding is strongly correlated with aggregate levels of 
foreign currency lending in transition countries. Controls on international borrowing or 
foreign direct investment may limit the access of banks to such funding. We therefore 
include the variable Capital controls (taken from AREAER), which measures whether there 
are controls on foreign borrowing by or foreign direct investment in domestic firms 
(including banks) in a country. 
Finally, the supply of foreign currency loans by domestic banks may be affected by 
regulatory limits on their open foreign currency positions. To capture this, we include the 
variable Open fx position (also taken from AREAER), which measures the maximum total 
open foreign currency position a bank in a country may have as a percentage of its capital. 
3.  Summary Statistics 
Table 4 displays summary statistics for our macroeconomic explanatory variables, 
with Panel A displaying means by country. This table reveals positive values of the interest 
rate differential in almost all countries independent of the indicator considered. This implies   36 
a widespread interest rate advantage to taking foreign currency loans rather than local 
currency loans in our sample. This interest rate advantage does, however, vary substantially 
across countries. Panel B of Table 4 further shows that there is a substantial decline in the 
nominal interest rate differential over time. The variables Interest rate differential – USD 
and Interest rate differential – Euro decline from more than 10% in 2002 to below 4% in 
2005. The decline is more moderate in the two interest rate differentials obtained from 
Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2007). This may be due to the fact that their panel data 
is unbalanced. 
[Table 4 here] 
Table 4 confirms that uncovered interest parity did not hold (ex-post) for the majority 
of countries in our sample during the observation period. Despite the substantial interest 
rate disadvantage vis-à-vis the US dollar, we find that the currencies of most countries 
appreciated (rather than depreciated) against the US dollar. Moreover, while the majority of 
currencies did depreciate against the euro, the magnitude of this depreciation was 
substantially lower than that of the nominal interest rate differential. 
Table 5 summarizes the exchange rate regime and political affiliation per country for 
our observation period of 2002:I to 2005:II. The majority of countries have a floating 
exchange rate regime. Several countries with plans to join the EU, however, adhere to a 
fixed rate regime in line with the Exchange Rate Mechanism II program. 
[Table 5 here] 
Table 6 displays summary statistics for our indicators of the banking sector and 
institutional environment. Foreign presence in the banking sector varies strongly, with 
foreign banks controlling over 90% of the assets in some countries (Croatia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Slovak republic), and less than 10% in others (Azerbaijan, Russia, Tajikistan,   37 
Uzbekistan). The table further shows that dollarization of the economy varies strongly 
across our sample. Half of the countries in the sample appear to be highly dollarized, with 
shares of foreign currency deposits in the banking sector exceeding 50%. Panel B of Table 
6 shows that dollarization dropped between 2002 and 2005, while foreign bank influence 
increased. 
[Table 6 here] 
Alternative foreign currency hedging instruments are limited in our sample, with 
forward currency markets underdeveloped in most countries. Furthermore, due to the 
existence of capital controls, banks in several countries have limited access to foreign 
funding. Panel B of Table 6 shows that the development of forward currency markets has 
only slightly improved between 2002 and 2005, while capital controls have been slightly 
reduced. Regulations on foreign currency positions are quite similar across countries in our 
sample, with open positions limited to 20%-30% of bank capital. The only notable 
exceptions are Kazakhstan and Macedonia, where banks can have open foreign currency 
positions up to 50% of their capital. 
V. Results 
A.  Firm-Level Determinants of Loan Currency Denomination 
1.  Full Sample Results 
Table 7 provides full sample estimates when Forex loan is regressed on firm and loan 
characteristics. Column (1) reports estimates without accounting for country fixed effects. 
The model in Column (2) includes country-fixed effects, Column (3) country-year effects, 
and Column (4) country-quarter effects. We focus on the results of Column (4), as the other 
models yield similar estimates but include fewer effects. We report for all regressions the   38 
marginal effects at the sample means based on probit estimations. The T-statistics reported 
in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the country level. 
[Table 7 here] 
The estimates displayed in Table 7 suggest that the choice of loan denomination is 
systematically related to the currency in which firms yield revenue. Exporters and Foreign 
firms obtain more foreign currency loans. All three coefficients are also economically 
relevant. At the means of the other variables, the percentage of foreign loans increases from 
22% for non-exporters to 31% for exporters (remember that around 25% of all loans in the 
sample were in foreign currency). Similarly, the percentage of foreign loans increases from 
22% for domestic to 47% for foreign firms. 
Full sample estimates for our indicators of firm distress costs are mixed. As predicted 
we find a significant positive correlation between Security costs and loan denomination. 
Firms with higher security costs, which we argue have a lower private value of doing 
business, are more likely to take a foreign currency loan. However, this relation is not 
confirmed by our other two measures of distress costs (Family firm, Debt). 
Estimates for indicators of firm opaqueness are also mixed. Neither Income via bank 
nor Audited firm display the expected significant negative coefficient, suggesting that 
opaqueness does not encourage foreign currency borrowing. Moreover, we find a 
significant positive correlation between international accounting standards and foreign 
currency borrowing. However, this result may be explained by the fact that firms that 
adhere to international standards are more likely to have foreign currency income. More in 
line with our prediction is the finding that firms with a longer public track record are less 
likely to take foreign loans. More than 27% of the loans of the new firms are in a foreign 
currency, while for firms of more than the mean age around 24% of loans are in the foreign   39 
currency. This result could indicate that in general more publicly available information 
about a firm decreases its ability to obtain bank loans in a foreign currency. 
Finally, loans with a longer maturity are more likely to be in a foreign currency. Only 
17% of the one-month loans are denominated in a foreign currency, while 26% of the three-
year loans are. The coefficient on Collateralized, on the other hand, is not significant. 
2.  Sample Splits 
The fact that our full sample results are mixed for indicators of distress costs and firm 
opaqueness is not too surprising. After all, our theoretical framework does not predict that 
these indicators should affect the loan denomination choice of all firms. We expect that 
distress costs and opaqueness should affect loan denomination only for firms that do not 
have income in foreign currency. In addition, we expect that distress costs should affect 
firms only when exchange rates are volatile, and thus the probability of defaulting on an 
unhedged foreign currency loan is high. The fact that we pool firms with and without 
foreign currency earnings in our full sample regressions, and assume that the impact of 
distress costs is similar for firms in countries with stable and volatile exchange rates, may 
explain why the results in Table 7 are weak. 
In Table 8, we try to isolate the ‘true’ local earners by splitting the sample according 
to firm-level income structure and the country-level degree of real dollarization. We first 
classify Non-forex firms as firms that have no export sales, no sales to multinationals, and 
no majority foreign owner. Forex firms are all other firms. We then classify Weakly 
dollarized countries as those that have a mean share of foreign exchange deposits in the 
banking system of 50% or less for the observation period. Table 6 shows that within our 
sample there are 13 such countries. Strongly dollarized economies have a mean share of 
foreign exchange deposits in the banking system exceeding 50% for the observation period.   40 
Table 6 shows that within our sample there are 12 such countries. Based on the above 
definitions we distinguish between Local and Foreign currency earners. Local currency 
earners are Non-forex firms that are situated in Weakly dollarized countries. Foreign 
currency earners are all other firms. 
We further split our sample depending on whether firms are located in a country with 
a pegged or floating exchange rate. Table 5 shows that there are 15 countries with floating 
regimes and 12 with pegged regimes (currency board, fixed peg or crawling peg). We report 
the results for the corresponding subsamples in Table 8. 
[Table 8 here] 
Our sample splits provide limited support the conjecture that firm-level distress costs 
or opaqueness affects the loan choice for Local currency earners. None of our indicators of 
firm distress cost (Family firm, Security costs, Debt) or opaqueness (Audited firm, Income 
via bank) display a significant coefficient in Column (1) of Table 8. However, comparing 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 we do find that Audited firm displays the expected negative 
sign for local currency earners, while it displays a positive sign for foreign currency earners. 
This finding suggests that there may be a two-sided effect of financial transparency on 
borrowing behavior. On the one-hand, financial transparency may help foreign currency 
earners to borrow in foreign currency. On the other hand, as suggested by our model, 
financial transparency lowers the ability of local currency earners to imitate foreign 
currency ones. This conjecture is partly supported by our analysis in Panel B of Table 8 
where we interact all firm characteristics with Local currency earner (a dummy that equals 
one if the firm is a local currency earner and equals zero otherwise). In Column (2) the 
coefficient on the interactions with Audited firm is negative and significant, providing some 
qualified support for the opaqueness implications of our model.   41 
Our sample splits provide little support for the conjecture that distress costs matter 
more for firms that are subject to more volatile exchange rates. In Panel A of Table 8 we 
find as expected that security costs affect loan choice only for firms in countries with 
floating exchange rates. However, the interaction effects in column (3) of Panel B suggest 
that the effect for security costs is not significantly different between the two sub-samples. 
Moreover, we find no significant results for our other two measures of distress costs, 
Family firm and Debt. 
B.  Macroeconomic Determinants of Loan Currency Denomination 
1.  Full Sample Results 
In Table 9 we report a full sample analysis, including our four measures of the 
Interest rate differential, as well as our measures of Depreciation, exchange rate volatility 
(Depreciation volatility, Peg, EU) , and domestic Inflation volatility. We expect the interest 
rate differential and inflation volatility to have positive effects, and the depreciation and 
exchange rate volatility to have negative effects. 
[Table 9 here] 
Panel A reports the coefficients for estimations excluding country fixed effects, with 
inference based on standard errors that are either adjusted or not adjusted for clustering at 
the country level. As expected, we find that the estimated coefficient is positive for all four 
indicators of the nominal interest rate differential. The significance of the coefficients holds 
for both clustered and non-clustered errors. However, while the impact of the interest rate 
differential is statistically significant, its economic relevance is weak. The coefficients in 
columns (1) and (2) of the table suggest, for example, that (at the sample mean) a 1% 
increase in the interest rate differential to the US dollar or euro increases the share of   42 
foreign currency loans by 0.6%. Given the sample means of the interest rate differentials on 
US dollar (8.7%) and euro (7.6%), this implies that raising the interest differential by more 
than 10% of its mean increases foreign currency borrowing by just 2.4% of its mean (25%).  
Our model predicts that firms should not consider the nominal interest rate 
differential alone, but instead the net interest rate differential, taking into account the 
expected depreciation. Indeed, we find that the coefficient of Depreciation – Euro is 
negative and of similar magnitude to the coefficient of the nominal interest rate 
differential.
22 Again this coefficient is significant for both clustered and non-clustered 
errors. However, our results also show that the coefficient of Depreciation – USD is not 
significant at all. These findings suggest that for those firms in our sample that are primarily 
motivated by interest rate differentials to take foreign currency loans, the euro may be the 
more relevant comparison currency. 
Table 9 provides mixed results on the relevance of exchange rate volatility for firms’ 
choices of loan denomination. Our results suggest that past volatility of depreciation vis-à-
vis the US dollar or euro does not affect firms’ choices: the coefficients of Depreciation 
volatility are insignificant for both currencies. However, in line with our predictions, we do 
find that firms located in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes are more likely to take 
foreign currency loans. The coefficient of Peg is positive and significant in columns (1) and 
(2). Surprisingly, though, after controlling for the exchange rate regime we do not find that 
countries that are on track to join the European Union display higher levels of foreign 
currency borrowing. Finally, as predicted by Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003), we find that 
higher levels of volatility of domestic inflation encourage foreign currency borrowing. This 
                                                 
22 Indeed, a Wald test suggests that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of Interest differential 
– Euro and Depreciation – Euro in Column (2) add up to zero.   43 
confirms the findings of Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2007) and Luca and Petrova 
(2008) for aggregate credit dollarization. 
In Panel B of Table 9 we examine the extent to which our results above could be driven by 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries. Table 4 shows that the macroeconomic 
conditions vary substantially across the countries in our sample. These differences may be 
correlated with institutional features of the banking sector or common characteristics of the 
firms within each country. To account for unobserved heterogeneity across countries, Panel 
B of Table 9 replicates our analysis including country fixed effects. The results show that 
the significance of most of our macroeconomic variables disappears when we control for 
country fixed effects. The coefficients of three of our measures of nominal interest rate 
differentials (Interest diff. – USD, – Euro, and – Loans) drop substantially and are no longer 
significant. The variable Depreciation – Euro also falls in magnitude and loses significance. 
The only macroeconomic variable that consistently retains a significant coefficient after 
including country fixed effects is domestic Inflation volatility. 
Note that despite our short observation period of three years, there is substantial time 
variation in our macroeconomic variables. For example, as shown in Table 4, nominal 
interest rate differentials drop on average from more than 10% in 2002:I to below 4% in 
2005:II. Likewise, exchange rate movements against the euro vary from a depreciation of 
8% in 2002:III to an appreciation of 2.8% in 2004:II. Thus our finding that the explanatory 
power of macroeconomic variables drops when we introduce country fixed effects cannot 
be accounted for by lack of variation in these variables. The results in Panel B of Table 9 
therefore suggest that foreign currency borrowing by firms in our sample may be less 
related to variation in nominal interest rate differentials and exchange rate movements, than 
to differences in institutional settings across countries.   44 
2.  Sample Splits 
We check the robustness of our macroeconomic results by estimating coefficients for 
various subsamples in Table 10. First, we expect that the impact of interest rate differentials 
and exchange rate movements on loan denomination choice should be stronger for local 
currency earners than for foreign currency earners. In Panel A of the table we therefore 
conduct OLS regressions interacting each macroeconomic explanatory variable with the 
dummy variable Local currency earner. We conduct this analysis both for USD-related 
macro variables (Columns 1) and euro-related variables (Column 2). The results support 
our above findings that interest rate differentials and exchange rate movements do not drive 
foreign currency borrowing in our sample. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find that 
local currency earners react more strongly to changes in these macro variables than foreign 
currency earners. The interaction terms of Local currency earner with Interest differential, 
Depreciation, and Depreciation volatility, as well as with Inflation volatility, are all 
insignificant. Interestingly, we find that local currency earners are less likely than foreign 
currency earners to take foreign currency loans in countries that are on track to join the 
European Union. This result suggests that those firms that have (some) foreign currency 
income, rather than those that have none at all, are more likely to take foreign currency 
loans when the exchange rate environment becomes more stable. 
One reason for the weak impact of the macroeconomic variables in Table 9 may be 
that the relevant foreign currency for firms differs across countries. Our full sample analysis 
assumes that the US dollar and the euro are equally important as reference currencies in all 
countries. Existing evidence suggests, however, that the euro is the most relevant foreign 
currency in Eastern European transition countries (Rosenberg and Tirpak (2008)) , while 
the US dollar is more relevant in countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States   45 
(Brown, Rueda Maurer, Pak and Tynaev (2007), Luca and Petrova (2008)). In Panel A of 
Table 10 we therefore also repeat our full sample analysis, including the interaction terms 
of our macro variables with EU (Columns 2 and 3) and CIS (Columns 3 and 4) respectively. 
Contrary to our expectations, we do not find that firms in European Union accession 
countries react more strongly to interest rate differentials and depreciation against the euro 
than firms in non-accession countries (Column 4). Moreover, we do not find that the loan 
currency choice of firms in CIS countries is more strongly affected by interest rate 
differentials and depreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar (Column 5).  
 [Table 10 here] 
The impact of changes in macroeconomic conditions on foreign currency borrowing 
within a country may depend strongly on the level of the macroeconomic parameters of that 
country. This is not accounted for in our full sample analysis in Table 9, which reports 
marginal effects at the sample means only. In Panel C of Table 10 we therefore replicate our 
analysis of macroeconomic determinants for each country separately. The results in this 
panel confirm that changes in macroeconomic conditions have little impact on foreign 
currency borrowing within countries. We find, for example, that Interest differential – USD 
is only significant for 2 of 19 countries, while Depreciation – USD is only negative and 
significant for one country. Likewise Interest differential – Euro is only significant for 3 
countries, while Depreciation – Euro is only significant for one country. 
C.  Institutional Determinants of Loan Currency Denomination 
If interest rate differentials and exchange rate movements hardly affect the loan 
currency choice of firms in our sample, how can we explain the strong cross-country 
variation in foreign currency borrowing observed in our data? In Table 11 we examine the 
extent to which institutional differences across countries may be responsible for this   46 
variation. Our theoretical model suggests that foreign currency borrowing may be positively 
associated with strong foreign bank presence and weak corporate governance, which may 
both aggravate information asymmetries between firms and banks. In addition, we expect 
more foreign currency borrowing in countries with a higher degree of dollarization in the 
real economy. The demand for foreign currency loans should further be affected by the 
availability of alternative hedging instruments, such as forward contracts. Finally, the 
supply of foreign currency loans may be affected by regulations that limit the refinancing 
opportunities of banks abroad and their ability to hold open foreign currency positions. 
[Table 11 here] 
The results in Table 11 suggest that institutional characteristics do contribute to 
explaining cross-country differences in foreign currency borrowing. We find that in 
countries with higher Foreign bank presence and lower indices of Enterprise reform, firms 
are more likely to take foreign currency loans. These results suggest that information 
asymmetries may indeed foster foreign currency borrowing in our sample. However, the 
positive effect of foreign bank presence could also be due to the fact that foreign banks have 
easier access to funding in foreign currency, which increases the supply of loans in these 
currencies. Supporting this interpretation, we find that countries that impose Capital 
controls display lower levels of foreign currency borrowing, suggesting that these limit the 
supply of foreign currency loans by banks. Thus in line with the aggregate evidence by 
Rosenberg and Tirpak (2008) but in contrast to the bank-level evidence by Haiss, Paulhart 
and Rainer (2008), our results suggest that international funding is an important 
determinant of loan dollarization in transition countries. 
The results in Table 11 further show that countries with more generous supervisory 
limits on open foreign currency positions of banks also display higher shares of foreign   47 
currency borrowing. This finding also supports the above results that supply-side 
constraints seem to be relevant in explaining the cross-country variation in our sample. 
Our results do not confirm that foreign currency borrowing is more frequent in 
countries with higher degrees of real dollarization: the share of foreign currency deposits in 
a country (Forex deposits) does not bear the expected positive and significant coefficient. In 
addition, foreign currency loans are not more frequent in CIS countries, which are 
characterized by a higher degree of real dollarization. Further, in contrast to Luca and 
Petrova (2008), we do not find that the development of forward foreign currency markets 
affects foreign currency borrowing. This result supports our earlier conjecture that forward 
contracts are hardly relevant as alternative hedging instruments for our sample of small 
firms. 
Finally, Table 11 confirms our previous results, that interest rate differentials and 
exchange rate movements cannot explain foreign currency borrowing in our sample. 
Controlling for institutional differences across countries, we find that our indicators of 
Interest differentials, Depreciation, and Depreciation volatility yield insignificant 
coefficients. Confirming our earlier results, we do, however, find that greater volatility of 
domestic inflation encourages foreign currency borrowing. 
VI.  Conclusion 
Motivated by policy concerns about the credit risks resulting from unhedged foreign 
currency loans, especially in opaque financial environments, we investigate how an 
information asymmetry between banks and firms in a theoretical framework – that also 
features the trade-off between the cost and the risk of debt – may determine the currency 
denomination of bank loans to firms. Banks may not know the currency in which firms have 
contracted their sales or the level of firm revenues. Foreign currency earners and local   48 
currency earners with distress costs that are small vis-à-vis the interest rate differential 
choose foreign currency loans if the foreign interest rate is lower. With imperfect 
information for the banks concerning the currency and level of firm revenues, we show that 
more local currency earners switch to foreign currency loans. 
We then test these implications of our theoretical model by using a 2005 survey of 
9,655 firms from 26 transition countries. We find strong evidence that firms with foreign 
currency earnings borrow more in foreign currency. However, we find only weak evidence 
that firms with lower distress costs and opaque firms are more likely to borrow in foreign 
currency. 
At the country level, we find that neither interest rate advantages nor exchange rate 
movements explain foreign currency borrowing in our sample. We do however find that 
foreign bank presence, corporate governance and controls on incoming international capital 
flows explain cross-country differences in loan dollarization. Hence, employing reasonable 
firm and country proxies, we cannot confirm that “carry-trade behavior” is the key driver of 
the recently observed increase in foreign currency borrowing by small firms in transition 
economies. Our results do, however, support the conjecture that banking-sector structures 
and institutions that aggravate information asymmetries may be facilitating (unhedged) 
foreign currency borrowing. Thus, while our findings may partly allay some concerns of 
policymakers on foreign currency borrowing in these countries, policy innovations towards 
transparency may still be called for.Table 1. Variable definitions 
 
Data Sources: AREAER: Annual report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions of the International Monetary Fund; BCJ: Basso, Calvo-
Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2007); BEEPS: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey in 2005 by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the World Bank; CIAF: CIA Factbook; IFS: International Finance Statistics of the International Monetary Fund; TR: Transition report 
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
 
Variable Name  Definition  Source 
Forex loan  1= last loan of firm was in a foreign currency, 0= last loan of firm was in local currency.  BEEPS 
Duration  Duration of the loan, in months.  BEEPS 
Collateralized  1= yes, 0= no.  BEEPS 
Collateral value  The value of collateral posted by the firm over loan size, in %.  BEEPS 
Interest rate  Interest rate per annum, in %.  BEEPS 
Exporter  1= firm has export revenues, 0= otherwise.  BEEPS 
Sales to multinationals  1= firm has domestic sales to multinational companies, 0= otherwise.  BEEPS 
Foreign firm  1= at least 50% of ownership in foreign hands, 0= otherwise.  BEEPS 
Family firm  1= firm is owned by sole proprietor or family, 0= otherwise.  BEEPS 
Security costs  Expenses for security services over sales.  BEEPS 
Debt  Share of short-term investment financed by debt.  BEEPS 
Audited firm  1= firm has an external auditor, 0= otherwise.  BEEPS 
Income via bank  Share of firm revenues that are received through bank transfers.  BEEPS 
International accounting  1= firm applies international accounting standards (IAS or USGAAP), 0= otherwise.  BEEPS 
Small firm  1= less than 50 employees, 0= otherwise.  BEEPS 
Age  Age of firm at time of loan disbursement, in years.  BEEPS 
Interest diff. - USD (- Euro)  Domestic Tbill / money market rate minus US Tbill rate (Eurepo rate), in the past quarter.  IFS 
Interest diff. - loans (– deposits)  Difference in nominal interest rates on 1-year loans (deposits): local minus foreign currency rate, in the past quarter.  BCJ 
Depreciation - USD (- Euro)  Depreciation of local currency versus the US$ (Euro), nominal, in %, during the past quarter.  IFS 
Deprec. volatility - USD (- Euro)  Variance of monthly changes in the real exchange rate versus the US$ (Euro), in %, during the past 4 quarters.   IFS 
Peg  1= country has crawling peg fixed peg or currency board exchange rate regime, 0= otherwise.  AREAER 
EU  1= country is or has completed negotiations to become EU member, 0= otherwise.  CIAF 
Inflation volatility  Variance of monthly changes in the consumer price index, in %, during the past 4 quarters.  IFS 
Foreign banks  Assets share of foreign controlled banks in domestic banking system, in %.  TR 
Enterprise reform  EBRD index of Enterprise reform. Scale: 1 to 4.33.  TR 
Forex deposits  Share of deposits in the banking sector denominated in foreign currency, in %.  BCJ 
CIS  1= country is member of commonwealth of independent states, 0= otherwise.  CIAF 
Forward fx market  1= country has developed forward foreign exchange market, 0= otherwise.  AREAER 
Capital controls  1= country has controls on foreign borrowing by or foreign direct investment in domestic firms, 0= otherwise.  AREAER 
Open fx position  Maximum total open foreign exchange position of banks over capital, in %.  AREAER  
Table 2. Loan characteristics: Summary statistics 
 
Forex loan: 1= last loan of firm was in a foreign currency, 0= last loan of firm was in local 
currency. Duration: Duration of the loan, in months. Collateralized: 1= yes, 0= no. Collateral 
value: The value of collateral posted by the firm over loan size, in %. Interest rate: Interest rate per 
annum, in %. 
 
Panel A: Sample means by country 
 




value  Interest rate 
Albania  81  0.73  37.4  0.96  165  9.5 
Armenia  140  0.29  22.3  0.74  133  14.8 
Azerbaijan  4  0.25  59.0  1.00  163  15.0 
Belarus  79  0.27  19.9  0.89  128  18.0 
Bosnia  94  0.02  35.4  0.97  208  10.2 
Bulgaria  102  0.29  37.6  0.88  144  11.1 
Croatia  130  0.27  49.3  0.80  115  7.6 
Czech Rep.  84  0.07  33.3  0.82  108  9.3 
Estonia  69  0.28  51.3  0.90  132  6.7 
Georgia  53  0.66  24.7  0.92  174  18.4 
Hungary  262  0.24  30.5  0.92  155  13.2 
Kazakhstan  232  0.26  28.2  0.96  143  15.9 
Kyrgyzstan  70  0.36  22.6  0.96  186  19.0 
Latvia  84  0.23  40.1  0.92  128  6.8 
Lithuania  69  0.25  32.1  0.84  114  5.7 
Macedonia  35  0.46  20.4  0.94  199  10.9 
Moldova  134  0.25  18.5  0.93  140  20.9 
Poland  306  0.14  29.1  0.79  119  12.6 
Romania  254  0.39  25.3  0.93  143  18.0 
Russia  177  0.12  23.2  0.90  136  17.4 
Serbia  114  0.19  21.0  0.90  174  13.3 
Slovak Rep.  64  0.06  39.7  0.83  103  7.6 
Slovenia  125  0.25  40.7  0.60  89  6.3 
Tajikistan  38  0.26  20.5  0.84  151  24.5 
Ukraine  218  0.23  18.8  0.83  160  20.4 
Uzbekistan  87  0.06  20.9  0.77  95  22.8 






Panel B: Sample means by period 
 
Year:Quarter  Observations  Forex loan  Duration  Collateralized 
Collateral 
value  Interest 
2002:I  92  0.24  40.94  0.89  142.67  15.36 
2002:II  120  0.28  37.49  0.89  129.81  13.07 
2002:III  56  0.27  34.57  0.88  130.98  15.13 
2002:IV  67  0.25  41.16  0.87  132.06  13.06 
2003:I  142  0.28  30.68  0.89  132.59  15.07 
2003:II  166  0.25  28.16  0.84  142.24  14.26 
2003:III  120  0.28  30.65  0.88  154.46  15.11 
2003:IV  115  0.27  35.63  0.83  130.33  13.15 
2004:I  354  0.21  24.86  0.86  140.87  14.75 
2004:II  441  0.24  26.86  0.88  141.08  14.41 
2004:III  399  0.31  30.39  0.85  144.11  13.83 
2004:IV  489  0.22  27.93  0.88  144.26  14.16 
2005:I  484  0.23  25.19  0.86  134.59  13.73 
2005:II  60  0.22  27.55  0.88  134.04  13.25 
 
 
Panel C: Pairwise correlations 
  Forex loan  Duration   Collateralized  Collateral value  Interest 
Forex Loan  1.00         
Duration  0.15  1.00       
Collateralized  0.01  0.06  1.00     
Collateral value  0.04  0.00  0.63  1.00   
Interest  -0.13  -0.22  0.07  0.09  1.00 
 





Table 3. Firm characteristics: Summary statistics 
 
Exporter: 1= firm has export revenues, 0= otherwise. Sales to multinationals: 1= firm has domestic 
sales to multinational companies, 0= otherwise. Foreign firm: 1= at least 50% of ownership in 
foreign  hands,  0=  otherwise.  Family  firm:  1=  firm  is  owned  by  sole  proprietor  or  family,  0= 
otherwise. Security costs: Expenses for security services over sales, in %. Debt: Share of short-term 
investment financed by debt. Audited firm: 1= firm has an external auditor, 0= otherwise. Income 
via bank: Share of firm revenues that are received through bank transfers. International accounting: 
1= firm applies international accounting standards (IAS or USGAAP), 0= otherwise. Small firm: 1= 
less than 50 employees, 0= otherwise. Age: Age of firm at loan disbursement, in years. 
 
Panel A: Sample means by choice of loan denomination 
 
The reported difference tests are standard t-tests. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
   Total 
Firms w/ local 
currency loan  
Firms w/ foreign 
currency loan 
Difference tests   
Exporter  0.34  0.31  0.43  t(3,101) = 6.25  *** 
Sales to multinationals  0.18  0.17  0.24  t(3,020) = 4.46  *** 
Foreign firm  0.11  0.08  0.20  t(3,105) = 9.03  *** 
           
Family firm  0.72  0.73  0.70  t(3,011) = 1.20   
Security costs  0.74  0.69  0.93  t(3,105) = 3.50  *** 
Debt  0.38  0.38  0.40  t(3,054) = 1.21   
           
Audited firm  0.53  0.51  0.59  t(3,071) = 4.20  *** 
Income via bank  0.57  0.58  0.55  t(3,099) = 1.94  * 
           
International accounting  0.22  0.19  0.31  t(3,105) = 7.16  *** 
Small firm  0.61  0.62  0.57  t(3,105) = 2.49  ** 






























































































































































Exporter  1                     
Sales to multinationals  .206  1                   
Foreign firm  .205  .178  1                 
Family firm  -.152  -.058  -.266  1               
Security costs  -.025  .037  .024  -.039  1             
Debt  .078  .094  .037  -.039  .004  1           
Audited firm  .189  .157  .179  -.248  .003  .041  1         
Income via bank  .290  .119  .107  -.157  -.009  .065  .167  1       
International accounting  .183  .115  .162  -.134  .026  .058  .202  .055  1     
Small firm  -.286  -.068  -.183  .364  -.075  -.039  -.314  -.182  -.231  1   





Table 4. Macroeconomic explanatory variables: Summary statistics 
 
The table displays four measures of the nominal Interest rate differential between local currency 
and foreign currency funds per country, in %. USD: Domestic Tbill rate minus US Tbill rate. Euro: 
Domestic Tbill rate minus Eurepo rate. Loans: Interest rate differential on loans. Deposits: Interest 
rate differential on deposits. The table further displays the Depreciation in % of the local currency 
against  the  US  dollar  (Euro).  Finally  the  table  displays  our  measures  of  monetary  volatility: 
Depreciation volatility: Variance of month on month changes in the real exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
USD (Euro). Inflation volatility: Variance of month on month changes in the consumer price index. 
 
Panel A: Sample means by country, 2002 – 2005 
 
  Interest rate differential  Depreciation  Deprec. volatility 
Country  - USD  - Euro  - Loans  - Deposits  -USD  -Euro  -USD  -Euro 
Inflation 
volatility 
Albania  6.7  5.5  6.4  5.6  -2.6  -0.1  9.3  6.8  2.0 
Armenia  9.2  8.0  0.8  2.6  -1.3  1.3  5.7  8.4  5.1 
Azerbaijan  7.7  6.5  -2.6  -0.2  0.2  2.9  0.8  7.3  0.8 
Belarus  31.8  30.7  9.0  20.2  2.8  5.5  1.1  8.7  1.2 
Bosnia                   
Bulgaria  1.8  0.7  3.6  1.0  -2.3  0.0  7.7  1.2  1.2 
Croatia  1.9  0.8  4.1  1.3  -2.4  0.0  8.9  3.4  0.2 
Czech Rep.  1.4  0.3  1.1  0.0  -3.1  -0.8  17.9  5.5  0.2 
Estonia  1.7  0.5  1.7  0.1  -2.3  0.0  7.5  0.3  0.2 
Georgia  32.1  31.0  3.0  -3.8  -0.8  1.8  4.3  8.4  1.4 
Hungary  8.0  6.8  7.4  6.1  -2.6  -0.2  9.5  3.4  0.3 
Kazakhstan  3.6  2.5  3.7  1.2  -0.8  1.9  0.9  8.3  0.2 
Kyrgyzstan  6.2  5.0  8.2  5.6  -1.0  1.7  6.6  12.8  1.1 
Latvia  1.7  0.6  4.0  1.2  -0.9  1.6  2.1  3.3  0.2 
Lithuania  1.1  -0.1  1.5  -0.2  -2.8  -0.4  6.9  2.3  0.2 
Macedonia  6.8  5.6  4.6  4.0  -2.3  0.1  8.3  1.4  0.5 
Moldova  8.9  7.8  10.0  10.6  -0.1  2.7  2.9  10.4  1.1 
Poland  5.9  4.7  6.1  2.7  -1.9  0.5  10.1  8.6  0.1 
Romania  20.6  19.5  17.2  11.2  -0.4  2.2  4.5  5.1  0.3 
Russia  5.4  4.3  4.0    -0.4  2.3  1.3  8.4  0.4 
Serbia  15.4  14.3      -0.2  2.4  7.7  2.5  1.8 
Slovak Rep.  4.7  3.6  1.7  0.9  -3.1  -0.7  8.0  3.8  1.1 
Slovenia  5.0  3.9  3.7  1.6  -1.7  0.7  7.7  1.2  0.2 
Tajikistan  15.9  14.7  -0.7  0.0  1.8  4.4       
Ukraine  5.6  4.5  8.8  1.8  -0.1  2.6  0.9  7.3  0.8 





Panel B: Sample means by quarter 
 
  Interest rate differential  Depreciation  Deprec. volatility 
Year:Quarter  - USD  - Euro  - Loans  - Deposits  -USD  -Euro  -USD  -Euro 
Inflation 
volatility 
2002:I  12.0  10.5  6.7  4.9  1.7  -1.9  3.4  6.1  1.1 
2002:II  11.6  10.0  5.0  4.6  2.1  1.1  3.2  5.8  1.1 
2002:III  10.6  8.9  4.5  3.8  -5.3  8.2  3.5  7.0  1.0 
2002:IV  10.5  8.9  4.6  3.7  1.0  -0.2  3.8  5.8  1.1 
2003:I  10.1  8.3  4.8  2.8  -2.8  3.4  4.3  4.7  1.0 
2003:II  9.1  7.6  3.7  3.4  -0.5  3.4  4.4  4.5  1.0 
2003:III  9.6  8.3  4.9  3.2  -3.6  1.1  7.1  4.7  0.9 
2003:IV  9.4  8.2  4.4  3.4  -0.3  1.7  9.6  6.2  0.8 
2004:I  9.6  8.4  4.3  3.2  -4.4  3.7  10.0  6.5  0.9 
2004:II  8.0  6.9  4.4  3.1  0.4  -2.8  10.4  7.8  0.8 
2004:III  7.0  6.0  4.2  2.6  -0.3  -0.9  7.9  6.4  0.9 
2004:IV  5.9  5.3  4.1  2.4  -1.2  0.9  5.2  4.9  0.7 
2005:I  4.9  4.7  4.1  2.3  -6.4  2.8  5.4  4.2  0.7 
2005:II  3.5  3.9  4.1  2.1  2.6  -2.4  6.6  4.6  0.7 
 
Panel C: Pairwise correlations 
  Interest rate differential  Depreciation  Deprec. volatility 
Year:Quarter  – USD  – Euro  – Loans  – Deposits  – USD  – Euro  – USD  – Euro 
Inflation 
volatility 
Int.diff. – USD   1                 
Int.diff. – Euro  .996  1               
Int.diff. – Loans  .265  .278  1             
Int.diff. – Dep.  .517  .523  .671  1           
Deprec. – USD  .526  .551  .101  .236  1         
Deprec. – Euro  .480  .467  .017  .186  .515  1       
Vol. – USD  .253  .267  .076  .114  .331  .200  1     
Vol. –  Euro  .577  .586  .240  .333  .562  .491  .588  1   






Table 5. Exchange rate regime and political affiliation 
 
The  table  summarizes  the  exchange  rate  regime  and  political  affiliation  per  country  for  our 
observation period of 2002:1 to 2005:2. All entries are denoted in Year:Quarter. Float: exchange 
rate regime is independently floating or managed float. Crawling Peg: exchange rate regime is a 
crawling peg or crawling band arrangement. Fixed peg: exchange rate regime is a conventional peg 
or currency board arrangement. EU: Country has completed negotiations to become EU member. 
CIS: Country is member of the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
 
 
Country  Float  Crawl Peg  Fixed Peg  EU  CIS 
Albania  2002:I-2005:II         
Armenia  2002:I-2005:II        from 1992:I 
Azerbaijan  2002:I-2005:II        from 1993:III 
Belarus    2002:I-2005:II      from 1992:I 
Bosnia      2002:I-2005:II     
Bulgaria      2002:I-2005:II  from 2005:I   
Croatia  2002:I-2005:II         
Czech Rep.  2002:I-2005:II      from 2003:I   
Estonia      2002:I-2005:II  from 2003:I   
Georgia  2002:I-2005:II        from 1994:I 
Hungary      2002:I-2005:II  from 2003:I   
Kazakhstan  2002:I-2005:II        from 1992:I 
Kyrgyzstan  2002:I-2005:II        from 1992:I 
Latvia      2002:I-2005:II  from 2003:I   
Lithuania      2002:I-2005:II  from 2003:I   
Macedonia      2002:I-2005:II     
Moldova  2002:I-2005:II        from 1992:I 
Poland  2002:I-2005:II      from 2003:I   
Romania    2002:I-2005:II    from 2005:I   
Russia  2002:I-2005:II        from 1992:I 
Serbia  from 2003:I         
Slovak Rep.  2002:I-2005:II      from 2003:I   
Slovenia    2002:I-2004:II  from 2004:III  from 2003:I   
Tajikistan  2002:I-2005:II        from 1992:I 
Ukraine      2002:I-2005:II    from 1992:I 






Table 6. Banking sector and institutional variables: Summary statistics 
 
The table displays summary statistics for our banking sector and institutional level explanatory 
variables. Foreign banks: Assets share of foreign controlled banks in domestic banking system, in 
%. Enterprise reform: EBRD index of Enterprise reform.  Forex deposits: Share of deposits in the 
banking  sector  denominated  in  foreign  currency,  in  %.  Forward  fx  market:  1=  country  has 
developed  forward  foreign  exchange  market,  0=  otherwise.  Capital  controls:  1=  country  has 
controls on foreign borrowing by or foreign direct investment in domestic firms, 0= otherwise. 
Open fx position: Maximal open foreign exchange position of banks over capital, in %. 
 















Albania  66.4  2  31.2  0  0  30 
Armenia  53.4  2.3  73.6  0  0  24 
Azerbaijan  5.3  1.91  49.5  0.71  1  20 
Belarus  16.2  1  57.1  0  1  20 
Bosnia  80.8  1.91  51.2  0  0.71   
Bulgaria  79.1  2.59  50.1  0  1  30 
Croatia  90.9  2.83  66.4  0  0.43  20 
Czech Rep.  85.5  3.3  10.8  1  1  20 
Estonia  97.9  3.36  28.6  1  1  30 
Georgia  35.1  2.04  95.6  0  0   
Hungary  77.9  3.36  16.4  1  0  30 
Kazakhstan  28.7  2  52.4  1  0  47 
Kyrgyzstan  62.5  2  0.6  0  0  20 
Latvia  49.5  2.91  40.1  1  0  20 
Lithuania  93.8  3  37.1  1  0  30 
Macedonia  46.8  2.3  52.6  0.71  0  50 
Moldova  32.9  1.83  50.7  0  0.57  20 
Poland  71.6  3.36  17.1  1  1   
Romania  55.9  2.04  44.9  0  0.29  20 
Russia  7.8  2.3  38.5  1  1  20 
Serbia  38.9  2.04  62.1  0  0.29  30 
Slovak Rep.  93.1  3.36  15.3  0  0  18 
Slovenia  19.2  3  32.8  1  0  20 
Tajikistan  4.6  1.7  55.6  0  1  23 
Ukraine  13.5  2  32.9  0  0  30 
























2002:I  46.8  2.34  45.7  0.35  0.46  27 
2002:II  46.8  2.34  46.6  0.35  0.46  27 
2002:III  46.8  2.34  45.6  0.35  0.46  27 
2002:IV  46.8  2.34  45.1  0.35  0.46  27 
2003:I  51.4  2.38  44.8  0.42  0.42  26 
2003:II  51.4  2.38  42.7  0.42  0.42  26 
2003:III  51.4  2.38  41.8  0.42  0.42  26 
2003:IV  51.4  2.38  42.1  0.42  0.42  26 
2004:I  53.5  2.39  41.7  0.42  0.42  27 
2004:II  53.5  2.39  41.0  0.42  0.42  27 
2004:III  53.5  2.39  40.8  0.42  0.42  27 
2004:IV  53.5  2.39  41.0  0.42  0.42  27 
2005:I  58.2  2.5  40.6  0.42  0.42  25 



















Foreign banks   1           
Enterprise reform  0.66  1         
Forex deposits  -0.34  -0.49  1       
Forward fx market  0.15  0.59  -0.42  1     
Capital controls  -0.14  -0.14  -0.04  0.03  1   





 Table 7. Firm-level determinants of foreign currency borrowing 
 
The table reports results of probit estimates. The dependent variable Forex loan equals one if the 
firm's last loan is denominated in foreign currency and zero if this loan is in local currency. All 
explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Each regression includes six sector dummies. The 
table displays the marginal effects calculated at sample means. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for cluster effects at the country level. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 






Exporter  0.077  0.081  0.081  0.091 
  [4.10]***  [4.46]***  [4.37]***  [3.99]*** 
Sales to multinationals  0.050  0.054  0.046  0.040 
  [1.76]*  [1.93]*  [1.63]  [1.27] 
Foreign firm  0.173  0.200  0.210  0.246 
  [4.38]***  [5.54]***  [5.79]***  [6.63]*** 
Family firm  0.033  0.030  0.034  0.040 
  [1.19]  [1.28]  [1.50]  [1.47] 
Security costs  0.014  0.010  0.014  0.016 
  [3.04]***  [2.78]***  [3.86]***  [4.09]*** 
Debt  0.011  0.024  0.034  0.046 
  [0.48]  [1.21]  [1.65]*  [1.76]* 
Audited firm  0.034  0.012  0.011  0.018 
  [0.97]  [0.57]  [0.47]  [0.71] 
Income via bank  -0.089  -0.021  -0.033  -0.047 
  [2.58]***  [0.74]  [1.19]  [1.46] 
International accounting  0.081  0.053  0.058  0.079 
  [2.50]**  [1.95]*  [2.01]**  [2.17]** 
Small firm  -0.008  -0.022  -0.034  -0.027 
  [0.33]  [0.79]  [1.16]  [0.79] 
Age  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002 
  [3.16]***  [2.01]**  [2.15]**  [2.18]** 
Duration  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003 
  [5.29]***  [5.05]***  [4.51]***  [4.75]*** 
Collateralized  0.031  -0.006  -0.007  -0.009 
  [0.78]  [0.16]  [0.18]  [0.21] 
Observations  2,779  2,779  2,679  2,381 





Table 8. Firm-level determinants: Subsamples 
 
The dependent variable Forex loan equals one if the firm's last loan is denominated in foreign 
currency and zero if this loan is in local currency. The table contrasts estimated coefficients for 
subsamples of firms, whereby our sample is split based on the income structure of firms and the 
dollarization level of the country the firms is situated in. Local currency earners are firms that have 
no  export  sales,  no sales to multinationals, and no majority foreign owner and are situated in 
weakly  dollarized  countries.  Foreign  currency  earners  are  all  other  firms.  Weakly  dollarized 
countries have a mean share of foreign currency deposits in the banking system of 50% or less for 
the observation period. Floating exchange rate are those firms situated in a country which has a 
floating exchange rate. Pegged exchange rate are those firms situated in countries with a currency 
board, fixed peg or crawling peg regime. Each regression includes country fixed effects and six 
sector dummies. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for cluster 
effects at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Probit estimates for subsamples 
Panel A reports probit estimates for subsamples as defined above. The table displays the marginal 
effects calculated at sample means.  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Exporter      0.074  0.097 
      [3.37]***  [2.77]*** 
Sales to multinationals      0.093  0.013 
      [2.62]***  [0.56] 
Foreign firm      0.123  0.280 
      [4.18]***  [5.72]*** 
Family firm  0.034  -0.008  0.029  0.032 
  [0.75]  [0.28]  [0.83]  [0.92] 
Security costs  0.009  0.011  0.009  0.010 
  [0.96]  [2.07]**  [2.67]***  [1.17] 
Debt  0.015  0.033  0.019  0.034 
  [0.48]  [1.16]  [0.57]  [1.55] 
Audited firm  -0.029  0.052  0.011  0.020 
  [1.37]  [1.82]*  [0.38]  [0.76] 
Income via bank  -0.024  -0.009  -0.040  0.007 
  [0.71]  [0.19]  [0.93]  [0.19] 
International accounting  0.001  0.092  0.072  0.010 
  [0.02]  [3.41]***  [2.57]**  [0.22] 
Small firm  -0.059  -0.010  -0.027  -0.026 
  [1.62]  [0.27]  [0.73]  [0.58] 
Age  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
  [1.34]  [2.23]**  [0.88]  [1.93]* 
Duration  0.002  0.003  0.001  0.004 
  [2.93]***  [5.76]***  [3.60]***  [7.93]*** 
Collateralized  0.064  -0.052  -0.079  0.091 
  [1.28]  [1.00]  [1.80]*  [1.71]* 
Observations  844  1,791  844  1,791 
Sector fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 






Panel B: OLS estimates with interaction terms 
Panel B reports results from OLS estimates for our full sample. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Exporter  0.074  0.063  0.092 
  [4.01]***  [2.69]**  [2.94]*** 
Sales to multinationals  0.049  0.033  0.007 
  [1.75]*  [1.02]  [0.26] 
Foreign firm  0.184  0.177  0.256 
  [4.89]***  [4.55]***  [5.17]*** 
Family firm  0.027  0.016  0.021 
  [1.22]  [0.64]  [0.69] 
Security costs  0.010  0.010  0.010 
  [2.45]**  [2.06]*  [1.16] 
Debt  0.022  0.014  0.026 
  [1.10]  [0.51]  [1.28] 
Audited firm  0.013  0.028  0.013 
  [0.66]  [1.14]  [0.51] 
Income via bank  -0.019  -0.025  0.001 
  [0.71]  [0.62]  [0.03] 
International accounting  0.052  0.062  0.013 
  [1.86]*  [2.42]**  [0.32] 
Small firm  -0.019  0.000  -0.024 
  [0.75]  [0.01]  [0.59] 
Age  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002 
  [2.04]*  [1.98]*  [2.07]** 
Duration  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  [4.67]***  [4.63]***  [4.70]*** 
Collateralized  -0.005  -0.005  -0.002 







   
Local currency 
earner  X 
Pegged exchange 
rate  X 
Exporter      0.035 
      [0.97] 
Sales to multinationals      -0.078 
      [1.67] 
Foreign firm      0.139 
      [2.44]** 
Family firm    0.025  -0.012 
    [0.77]  [0.26] 
Security costs     -0.001  0.000 
    [0.05]  [0.01] 
Debt     0.012  0.009 
    [0.29]  [0.25] 
Audited firm     -0.044  0.003 
    [2.09]**  [0.08] 
Income via bank     0.013  0.043 
    [0.30]  [0.84] 
International accounting    -0.053  -0.072 
    [1.03]  [1.41] 
Small firm     -0.056  -0.003 
    [1.53]  [0.06] 
Age     0.000  -0.001 
    [0.10]  [1.17] 
Observations  2,779  2,697  2,778 
R-squared  0.16  0.16  0.17 
Sector & country fixed effects  yes  yes  yes 





Table 9. Macroeconomic determinants of foreign currency borrowing 
 
The table reports results from probit estimates for our full sample. The dependent variable Forex 
loan equals one if the firm's last loan is denominated in foreign currency and zero if this loan is in 
local currency. Each regression includes the firm-specific explanatory variables Exporter, Sales to 
multinationals, Foreign firm, Family firm, Security costs, Debt, Audited firm, Income via bank, 
International  accounting,  Small  firm,  Age,  Duration  and  Collateralized,  as  well  as  six  sector 
dummies. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1.The table displays the marginal effects 
calculated at sample means. 
 
 
Panel A: Without country fixed effects 
T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors [not adjusted] resp. (adjusted) for 
clustering at country-level . *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Interest diff. – USD  0.006       
  [4.62]***       
  (3.11)***       
Interest diff. – Euro    0.006     
    [4.85]***     
    (3.56)***     
Interest diff. – loans      0.011   
      [4.22]***   
      (3.81)***   
Interest diff. – deposits        0.008 
        [3.06]*** 
        (1.76)* 
Depreciation – USD  -0.002    0.000  0.002 
  [0.94]    [0.16]  [0.51] 
  (0.71)    (0.15)  (0.54) 
Depreciation. volatility – USD  0.002    0.002  0.001 
  [1.02]    [0.73]  [0.36] 
  (0.51)    (0.39)  (0.21) 
Depreciation – Euro    -0.004  -0.004  -0.006 
    [2.23]**  [1.60]  [2.19]** 
    (1.73)*  (1.78)*  (2.88)*** 
Depreciation volatility – Euro    0.002  0.000  0.002 
    [0.94]  [0.08]  [0.66] 
    (0.60)  (0.07)  (0.57) 
Peg   0.060  0.065  0.025  0.026 
  [3.08]***  [3.18]***  [0.96]  [1.00] 
  (1.93)*  (1.80)*  (0.62)  (0.73) 
EU  -0.092  -0.081  -0.087  -0.104 
  [3.65]***  [3.68]***  [2.88]***  [3.26]*** 
  (2.12)**  (2.79)***  (1.66)*  (1.72)* 
Inflation volatility  0.017  0.018  0.024  0.014 
  [2.38]**  [2.59]***  [3.11]***  [1.80]* 
  (1.49)  (1.61)  (2.18)**  (1.33) 
Observations  2,584  2,584  2,058  1,868 
Firm-level explanatory variables  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sector fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 





Panel B: With country fixed effects 
T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors [not adjusted] resp. (adjusted) for 
clustering at country-level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Interest diff. – USD  0.003       
  [1.35]       
  (1.46)       
Interest diff. – Euro    0.003     
    [1.35]     
    (1.59)     
Interest diff. – loans      0.000   
      [0.07]   
      (0.09)   
Interest diff. – deposits        0.011 
        [1.71]* 
        (3.38)*** 
Depreciation - USD  0.003    0.006  0.008 
  [1.41]    [1.74]*  [2.34]** 
  (1.58)    (1.76)*  (2.85)*** 
Depreciation. volatility – USD  -0.004    -0.006  -0.006 
  [1.44]    [1.31]  [1.36] 
  (1.45)    (1.21)  (1.28) 
Depreciation – Euro    -0.001  -0.003  -0.005 
    [0.67]  [1.06]  [1.68]* 
    (0.82)  (1.17)  (2.63)*** 
Depreciation volatility – Euro    0.002  0.004  0.004 
    [0.67]  [1.11]  [1.03] 
    (0.89)  (1.70)*  (1.52) 
EU  0.050  0.011  0.042  0.076 
  [1.16]  [0.29]  [0.76]  [1.36] 
  (1.01)  (0.25)  (0.62)  (1.30) 
Inflation volatility  0.032  0.031  0.031  0.029 
  [1.83]*  [1.79]*  [1.65]*  [1.54] 
  (2.01)**  (2.20)**  (1.72)*  (1.58) 
Observations  2,584  2,584  2,057  1,866 
Firm-level explanatory variables  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sector fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 






Table 10. Macroeconomic determinants: subsample results 
 
The dependent variable Forex loan equals one if the firm's last loan is denominated in foreign 
currency  and  zero  if  this  loan  is  in  local  currency.  Each  regression  includes  the  firm-specific 
explanatory variables Exporter, Sales to multinationals, Foreign firm, Family firm, Security costs, 
Debt, Audited firm, Income via bank, International accounting, Small firm, Age, Duration and 
Collateralized. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are adjusted for 
cluster effects at the country level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Interaction effects 
The  table  reports  results  from  OLS  estimates  of  the  interaction  effects  of  our  macroeconomic 
explanatory variables with Local currency earner, EU and CIS respectively for our full sample. 
Local currency earners are firms that have no export sales, no sales to multinationals, and no 
majority foreign owner and are situated in weakly dollarized countries. Foreign currency earners 
are all other firms. Weakly dollarized countries have a mean share of foreign currency deposits in 
the banking system of 50% or less for the observation period. EU: firms located in countries which 
have  completed  negotiations  to  join  the  European  Union.  Non-EU:  all  other  firms.  CIS:  firms 
located in countries which are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Non-CIS: all 
other firms. Each regression also includes the main effects of each macroeconomic variable, as well 
as firm-level explanatory variables. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
       
Interaction term with  Local currency earner  EU  CIS 
Interest diff. – USD  -0.002    -0.005    0.002   
  [0.74]    [1.09]    [0.42]   
Depreciation – USD  0.002    -0.001    -0.008   
  [0.43]    [0.21]    [1.15]   
Deprec. volatility – USD  0.007    0.001    0.004   
  [1.45]    [0.23]    [0.71]   
Interest diff. – Euro    0.000    -0.004    -0.001 
    [0.04]    [1.39]    [0.17] 
Depreciation – Euro    0.002    0.007    -0.005 
    [1.08]    [2.34]**    [1.77]* 
Deprec. volatility – Euro    -0.004    -0.002    -0.001 
    [1.34]    [0.42]    [0.31] 
EU  -0.103  -0.043         
  [2.37]**  [1.75]*         
Inflation volatility  -0.016  0.015  0.096  0.106  0.013  0.008 
  [0.59]  [0.71]  [1.01]  [1.00]  [0.18]  [0.11] 
Observations  2,584  2,584  2,584  2,584  2,584  2,584 
R squared  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16 
Firm-level variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sector fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 






Panel B: Country-specific regressions 
Panel C replicates the regressions from column 1 (USD) and column 2 (Euro) of Panel A in Table 9 
for each country separately. Regressions for Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovak 
Republic,  Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan  could  not  be  carried  out  due  to  lack  of  country-level 
explanatory  variables  or  insufficient  variation  in  firm-level  data.  All  regressions  omit  sector 
dummies.  
 









Deprec.  Deprec. 
Volatility 
Albania  (70)  -0.003  -0.003  0.013  0.000  0.000  0.000 
    [0.53]  [1.14]  [2.25]**  [1.56]  [2.17]**  [0.65] 
Armenia  (135)  -0.009  0.045  0.029  0.009  0.004  0.031 
    [0.48]  [1.28]  [0.37]  [0.66]  [0.39]  [0.94] 
Belarus  (69)  0.013  0.024  -1.074  -0.011  -0.018  0.013 
    [0.86]  [0.30]  [2.09]**  [0.68]  [1.19]  [0.31] 
Bulgaria  (90)  0.088  -0.015  -0.016  0.181  -0.034  -0.323 
    [0.96]  [0.83]  [0.91]  [0.88]  [0.56]  [1.19] 
Croatia  (101)  0.013  0.026  0.017  0.030  0.020  -0.011 
    [0.44]  [2.01]**  [0.35]  [0.91]  [1.05]  [0.25] 
Georgia  (45)  -0.012  -0.208  -0.514  0.007  0.006  0.051 
    [1.49]  [2.44]**  [2.52]**  [0.87]  [0.29]  [0.89] 
Hungary  (220)  0.046  0.005  -0.018  0.049  -0.011  -0.070 
    [1.35]  [0.57]  [1.60]  [1.90]*  [0.70]  [2.00]** 
Kazakhstan  (227)  0.028  0.008  -0.059  -0.047  -0.001  0.004 
    [0.41]  [0.32]  [0.87]  [0.42]  [0.11]  [0.31] 
Kyrgyzstan  (63)  0.067  -0.031  0.008  0.098  0.006  0.025 
    [1.27]  [1.04]  [0.28]  [1.70]*  [0.45]  [1.15] 
Latvia  (65)  -0.105  0.009  -0.062  -0.011  0.016  -0.101 
    [1.86]*  [0.60]  [1.51]  [0.28]  [0.98]  [2.27]** 
Lithuania  (63)  -0.129  0.011  -0.010  0.040  0.013  -0.122 
    [1.47]  [1.01]  [1.03]  [0.58]  [0.50]  [0.96] 
Macedonia  (32)  -0.355  -0.104  0.065  -0.182  0.041  0.087 
    [1.28]  [1.28]  [1.15]  [0.76]  [0.24]  [0.25] 
Moldova  (122)  0.013  0.018  -0.029  0.007  0.004  -0.006 
    [0.92]  [1.03]  [0.62]  [0.49]  [0.63]  [0.24] 
Poland  (280)  0.011  0.004  0.002  0.013  0.005  0.001 
    [0.98]  [1.10]  [0.12]  [0.41]  [0.60]  [0.06] 
Romania  (224)  -0.001  0.012  0.016  0.001  -0.004  -0.018 
    [0.11]  [1.25]  [1.06]  [0.07]  [0.42]  [0.79] 
Russia  (162)  0.009  -0.006  0.007  0.001  0.011  -0.002 
    [0.56]  [0.60]  [0.12]  [0.08]  [1.62]  [0.24] 
Serbia  (106)  0.098  -0.007  -0.003  0.105  0.019  0.052 
    [1.87]*  [0.46]  [0.18]  [2.23]**  [0.58]  [0.77] 
Slovenia  (112)  -0.032  -0.006  0.014  -0.026  -0.055  0.026 
    [0.41]  [0.35]  [0.39]  [0.57]  [1.10]  [0.22] 
Ukraine  (209)  -0.014  0.168  0.149  -0.009  -0.005  -0.003 







Table 11. Institutional determinants of foreign currency borrowing 
 
The table reports results from probit estimates. The dependent variable Forex loan equals one if the 
firm's last loan is denominated in foreign currency and zero if this loan is in local currency. Each 
regression  includes  the  firm-specific  explanatory  variables  Exporter,  Sales  to  multinationals, 
Foreign  firm,  Family  firm,  Security  costs,  Debt,  Audited  firm,  Income  via  bank,  International 
accounting,  Small  firm,  Age,  Duration  and  Collateralized,  as  well  as  six  sector  dummies.  All 
explanatory variables are defined in Table 1.The table displays the marginal effects calculated at 
sample means. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Interest diff. – USD  -0.001  -0.001     
  [0.40]  [0.31]     
Depreciation – USD  0.002  0.002     
  [0.48]  [0.57]     
Depreciation volatility – USD  -0.003  -0.003     
  [1.03]  [1.26]     
Interest diff. – Euro      -0.001  -0.001 
      [0.49]  [0.40] 
Depreciation – Euro      -0.003  -0.003 
      [0.87]  [1.25] 
Depreciation volatility – Euro      0.005  0.005 
      [1.11]  [1.24] 
Peg  0.018  0.018  0.04  0.04 
  [0.52]  [0.34]  [1.22]  [0.93] 
EU  0  0  -0.031  -0.031 
  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.65]  [0.54] 
Inflation volatility  0.024  0.024  0.022  0.022 
  [2.07]**  [1.73]*  [2.00]**  [1.75]* 
Foreign banks  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  [2.80]***  [4.48]***  [2.83]***  [4.88]*** 
Enterprise reform  -0.254  -0.254  -0.265  -0.265 
  [4.31]***  [3.64]***  [4.44]***  [3.89]*** 
Forex deposits  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
  [2.80]***  [2.00]**  [2.11]**  [1.68]* 
CIS  -0.074  -0.074  -0.082  -0.082 
  [1.17]  [0.91]  [1.27]  [1.02] 
Forward fx market  -0.074  -0.074  -0.044  -0.044 
  [1.21]  [1.23]  [0.72]  [0.75] 
Capital controls  -0.058  -0.058  -0.067  -0.067 
  [1.73]*  [2.16]**  [2.06]**  [2.51]** 
Open fx position  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.004 
  [2.52]**  [3.01]***  [1.96]**  [2.32]** 
Observations  1,493  1,493  1,493  1,493 
Firm-level variables  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sector fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country fixed effects  no  no  no  no 
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